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 Regulating New Technologies:  
EU Internal Market Law, Risk,  
and Socio- Technical Order
Mark L. Flear*
1. Introduction
New and innovative technologies appear in the news on a daily basis and encom-
pass ‘red’ and ‘green’ technologies,1 information and communications technology, 
and those that have largely yet to become a reality such as nanotechnology.2 New 
technologies have the potential to meet pressing public needs such as growing 
sufficient or more nutritious food or the treatment of persistent or rare diseases 
(or indeed meeting private desires for new products and services). But they also 
give rise to concerns that science and technology are moving forward at such a 
fast pace that law and morality seemingly find it hard to keep pace, connect, 
and regulate. These concerns are reflected in much scholarly discussion on new 
technologies.3
In this chapter I challenge the latter account by arguing that, more than play-
ing catch up with and being determined by technoscientific innovation, law also 
plays a leading role in the regulation of new technologies by variously orchestrat-
ing, orienting, shaping, and directing the conditions of possibility for their devel-
opment and market availability.4 Specifically, I chart some of the main ways in 
* This chapter was written with the support of ESRC Seminar Series RES- 451- 26- 0764 (for 
which I was Principal Investigator). Thanks to Philip Leith and Dagmar Schiek for their insights 
and to Marise Cremona for encouraging me to write this chapter— and for her wonderful support 
throughout the process. The law cited in this chapter is accurate as of 22 December 2016.
1 ‘Red’ new technologies intervene in human biology whereas so- called ‘green’ new technologies 
intervene in the environment.
2 McHale, ‘Nanomedicine and the EU: Some Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Challenges’, 16(1) 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2009) 65.
3 For an overview see Brownsword, ‘So What Does the World Need Now? Reflections on 
Regulating Technologies’, in R. Brownsword and K. Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies:  Legal 
Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (2008).
4 In this sense internal market law is understood as part of and integrated within, while also 
being underpinned by, that which determines the conduct of conduct or what Foucault termed 
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which European Union (EU) internal market law retains its regulatory capacity 
and efficacy by centralizing the harms or hazards relating to product safety as ‘the’ 
risks posed by new technologies through complementary techniques of negative 
integration and positive integration. I explain how the centralization of this notion 
of risk in EU- level regulation has several linked purposes and consequences. In 
particular, designing regulation and limiting the understanding of risk (through 
it) marginalizes and obscures other kinds of harms or hazards to which risk might 
pertain (be they physical, environmental, social, economic, moral, or political), 
as well as alternative (and probably wider) understandings of risk and framings of 
regulation (such as by human rights and bioethics, both of which are particularly 
prominent and important discourses in relation to new technologies— as under-
lined in my own work and that of others, both noted later in the chapter). The cur-
rent regulatory design also depoliticizes and naturalizes the approach taken and 
its related (de)prioritizations of norms, values, and ends5— and this in turn helps 
to quell contestation about the focus and direction of scientific and technological 
development.6
In making that argument I point out how the focus and operation— and there-
fore the continued salience— of internal market law to risk regulation and its 
shaping of technoscientific trajectories relates to the EU’s broader strategic priori-
ties. In these priorities new technologies are useful to the generation of a com-
petitive and innovative market- based economy, and through it the construction 
and legitimation of the EU’s identity, socio- technical order and ultimately the 
project of European integration.7 The discussion in this chapter therefore adds to 
extant scholarly discussion of new technologies, including that within this col-
lection. Others have looked at certain categories of new technologies8 or central-
ized alternative actors or concerns.9 My own work has examined aspects of EU 
positive integration techniques in relation to new health technologies10 and has 
brought together scholars from law and cognate disciplines to reflect on specific 
‘governmentality’. See M. Foucault, Power, Essential Works of Foucault 1954– 1984, Volume 3 
(2002), esp. ‘Governmentality’.
5 Depoliticization refers to the way in which the construction of governance and regulatory 
arrangements is masked, which means that they appear instead as natural occurrences. For discus-
sion see W. Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (2006), at 15.
6 For reflection on the ongoing relevance of EU law, see, e.g., T. Tridimas, European Union Law 
for the Twenty- First Century: Volume 1: Rethinking the New Legal Order (2004).
7 For a similar argument on the relationship between law and identity, see Harding, ‘The Identity 
of European Law: Mapping Out the European Legal Space’, 6 European Law Journal (2000) 128.
8 S. Fovargue, Xenotransplantation and Risk: Regulating a Developing Biotechnology (2011); M. 
Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision- Making for a New Technology (2008). Within this 
collection see Chapter 2.
9 F. Francioni (ed.), Biotechnologies and International Human Rights (2007); T. Murphy (ed.), 
New Technologies and Human Rights (2009). Within this collection see Chapters 3, 5, and 7.
10 Bache, Flear, and Hervey, ‘The Defining Features of the European Union’s Approach to 
Regulating New Health Technologies’, in M. L. Flear et al. (eds), European Law and New Health 
Technologies (2013); Flear, ‘Clinical Trials Abroad: The Marketable Ethics, Weak Protections and 
Vulnerable Subjects of EU Law’, in A. Albors- Llorens et al. (eds), Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies, Volume 16 2013– 2014 (2014); M. L. Flear, Governing Public Health (2015), esp. chs 
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examples.11 In wider EU legal scholarship there has been a focus on negative inte-
gration, but it has given little attention to new technologies as a specific case study, 
or the joint workings of positive and negative integration techniques in that field. 
This chapter is therefore the first attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of 
those joint workings in the field of new technologies. It is also the first attempt to 
discuss how those specific techniques relate to the European integration project.
The argument I put forward in this chapter is built and advanced in the fol-
lowing way. In Section 2 I  situate law within the EU’s wider governance and 
in particular the programmatic concerns found in the EU’s overarching archi-
tecture.12 This is the starting point for explaining how EU internal market law 
comes to be concerned with the regulation of technological risk.13 In particular, 
it is by attention to the EU’s programmatic concerns that it becomes clearer how 
the tightening relations between new technologies and internal market law not 
only demonstrate the EU’s role in risk regulation but also the broader use and sig-
nificance of that involvement. Subsequently, I deepen the analysis in two moves, 
first, in Section 3, by outlining the three key regulatory principles underpinning 
the negative integration mode of internal market law. The first principle is a focus 
on removing restrictions to free movement that subjects almost any national mea-
sures to scrutiny, supplemented by the second principle, which is that of mutual 
recognition. The final principle is the justification of national measures subject to 
a proportionality assessment, which actually operates to constrain the type, scope, 
and nature of permissible risk regulation at Member State level, albeit not yet so 
far as to narrow it to product safety.
In the course of the discussion on regulatory principles, the link with the posi-
tive integration mode of internal market law is made and this is elaborated in 
Section 4 through the second move that aims to deepen the analysis.14 In addi-
tion to legislation adopted under Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
2, 7, and 8; Flear, ‘The EU Clinical Trials Regulation: Key Priorities, Purposes and Aims and the 
Implications for Public Health’, 42 Journal of Medical Ethics (2016) 192.
11 See, esp. the other chapters in M. L. Flear et  al. (eds), European Law and New Health 
Technologies (2013).
12 This chapter is therefore focused on the EU’s regulatory order, which is one level of the mul-
tilevel system of governance. Within that system the EU level interacts with a range of other regu-
latory orders including those at the national level. See further L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multilevel 
Governance and European Integration (2001).
13 Black’s definition of regulation is ‘the intentional use of authority to affect behaviour of a 
different party according to set standards, involving instruments of information- gathering and 
behaviour modification’ (Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, 27 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy (2002) 1). As suggested earlier, I  understand regulation as part of governmentality. 
Negative integration is deregulatory in the sense that it disapplies national laws that are deemed 
unjustifiably restrictive of free movement. But negative integration is also regulatory in that the 
disapplication of incompatible national laws affects the behaviour of market actors.
14 For further discussion of positive and negative integration see C. Barnard, The Substantive 
Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (5th edn, 2016), chs 1 and 16; Scharpf, ‘Negative and Positive 
Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States’, in G. Marks et al. (eds), 
Governance in the European Union (1996).
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the European Union (TFEU) positive integration is facilitated through several 
other kinds of supplementary regulatory techniques, including soft law, guidance, 
‘steering’ through funding, and reliance on intellectual property rights. The first 
of these techniques pre- empts Member State responses to the regulation of tech-
nological risk only to some extent. The other techniques work with legislative 
harmonization under Article 114 TFEU in order to extend the reach of EU- level 
regulation— including its normative orientation, understanding, and framing 
of ‘risk’— but without pre- emptive effects (indeed, EU funding is founded on 
legal bases that preclude such effects).15 Taken together these techniques of posi-
tive integration promote uniformity in technoscientific development trajectories 
within the EU. The techniques narrow the meaning and framing of technological 
risk to being principally about product safety at different stages of product devel-
opment and ultimately marketing within the internal market. At the same time 
the techniques bracket off and marginalize the other kinds of harms or hazards 
to which risk might pertain. These processes of centralization and marginaliza-
tion in turn help to serve broader programmatic priorities and aims, most impor-
tantly for this chapter, the production, stabilization, anchoring, and legitimation 
of the EU’s identity, socio- technical order, and project of integration. I consider 
the techniques of negative and positive integration in terms of their role in the 
development of new health technologies from an idea through to circulation in 
the internal market.
To keep the chapter manageable, the discussion is limited in several ways. The 
chief limitation is a focus on just one category of new technologies; those related 
to health, or new health technologies (NHTs). A focus on novel and innovative 
health technologies is useful in that it underscores the weakness of Article 168 
TFEU, the EU’s legal competence in the public health field, which is an area of 
supporting, coordinating, or supplementary competence under Article 6(a) TFEU, 
and essentially permits limited action in order to tackle serious cross- border threats 
to health. Although Article 168(5) TFEU provides that the EU legislature may 
‘adopt incentive measures’ that are designed to, inter alia, ‘protect and improve 
human health and in particular to combat the major cross- border health scourges’, 
this specifically excludes ‘any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States’.16 As we shall see later in this chapter, Article 114 TFEU pro-
vides far greater scope for the adoption of harmonization measures and these must 
15 Noted later in this chapter. Further consideration of pre- emption, and its relationship with 
the supremacy of directly effective EU law, is beyond the scope of this chapter. The relevant 
Treaty provisions (and applicable secondary legislation) discussed later in this chapter are (in the 
absence of specific decision by the CJEU arguably) directly effective (Case 26/ 62, Van Gend & 
Loos, [1963] ECR 1 (ECLI:EU:C:1963:1)) and therefore take precedence over conflicting national 
laws and administrative practices (Case 11/ 70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125 
(ECLI:EU:C:1970:114); Case 106/ 77, Simmenthal SpA, [1978] ECR 629 (ECLI:EU:C:1978:49). 
For a discussion of these doctrines and their relationship to pre- emption, see S. Douglas- Scott, 
Constitutional Law of the European Union (2002), at 169– 171.
16 In addition, Art. 168(7) TFEU provides the responsibility of the Member States for the ‘def-
inition of their health policy and for the organization and delivery of health services and medical 
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relate to the establishment and functioning of the internal market. The weakness 
of Article 168 as compared to Article 114 helps to explain the continuing salience 
of internal market law to new technologies as well as how that in turn facilitates 
the achievement of the EU’s broader programmatic priorities and aims (although, 
as we shall see, in at least one instance— clinical trials— internal market legislation 
gains support from Art. 168).
NHTs are not a single category in EU law. The Patients’ Rights Directive is 
the only piece of legislation that refers to ‘health technologies’, identifying them 
as including medicinal products, medical devices, or medical and surgical pro-
cedures as well as measures for disease prevention, diagnosis, or treatment used 
in healthcare.17 Elsewhere EU marketing legislation distinguishes between 
‘medicinal products’18 and ‘medical devices’.19 A  range of sub- categories 
exist— encompassing ‘biotechnology medicine’, ‘biotechnology- derived 
pharmaceutical’,20 ‘advanced therapy medicinal products’ (ATMPs),21 and 
care’ is respected. Legislation under Art. 114 TFEU and Art. 168 TFEU is adopted using the ordi-
nary legislative procedure set out in Art. 294 TFEU.
17 Art. 3(1) Directive 2011/ 24/ EU on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross- Border 
Healthcare, OJ 2011 L 88/ 45.
18 Directive 2001/ 83/ EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human 
Use, OJ 2001 L 311/ 67 (Community code (as amended)), has two limbs to its definition of ‘medic-
inal product’. These are medicinal product by ‘presentation’ (‘any substance or combination of 
substances presented for treating or preventing disease in human beings’— Art. 1(2) Community 
code) and by ‘function’ (‘any substance or combination of substances which may be used in or 
administered to human beings either with a view to restoring, correcting or modifying physiolog-
ical functions by exerting a pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action, or to making a 
medical diagnosis’).
19 Defined by Directive 93/ 42/ EEC Concerning Medical Devices, OJ 1993 L 169/ 1 to include 
‘any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article, whether used alone or 
in combination, including the software intended by its manufacturer to be used specifically for 
diagnostic and/ or therapeutic purposes and necessary for its proper application, intended by the 
manufacturer to be used for human beings’ for one or more of several purposes. Art. 1(2) provides 
that these purposes are:  ‘diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease; 
diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap; inves-
tigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological process; [or] control of 
conception’. To fall within this definition, the device must ‘not achieve its principal intended action 
in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means’, but it ‘may be 
assisted in its function by such means’.
20 The terms ‘biotechnology medicine’ or ‘biotechnology- derived pharmaceutical’ are generally 
used (EMA, S6 Preclinical Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology- Derived Pharmaceuticals, CHMP/ 
ICH/ 302/ 95) to cover the medicines derived from the processes listed in section 1 of the Annex 
(recombinant DNA technology, controlled expression of genes coding for biologically active pro-
teins in prokaryotes and eukaryotes including transformed mammalian cells, hybridoma, and mon-
oclonal antibody methods) to Regulation (EC) 726/ 2004 Laying Down Community Procedures 
for the Authorization and Supervision of Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and 
Establishing a European Medicines Agency, OJ 2004 L 311/ 67.
21 ATMPs are still classed as medicinal products and are included in section 1a of the Annex 
to Regulation (EC) 726/ 2004, ibid. The definition of ATMPs, under Regulation (EC) 1394/ 2007 
on Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products and Amending Directive 2001/ 83/ EC and Regulation 
(EC) 726/ 2004, OJ 2007 L 324/ 121, includes gene therapy medicinal products, somatic cell ther-
apy medicinal products, tissue- engineered products, and combined ATMPs. It appears that only 
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‘nanomedicine’22— and the ensuing discussion refers to all of these categories 
(some of which are not especially ‘new’23).
A key reason for the focus on NHTs is the need to provide a sufficiently detailed 
discussion and analysis of the complementary techniques of negative integration and 
positive integration in order to make the chapter’s core argument. As such the dis-
cussion does not provide a detailed substantive analysis of the application of internal 
market law to specific NHTs or other new technologies.24 In addition, some legisla-
tion that is obviously centrally related to technological risk (and not simply product 
safety matters), such as the so- called REACH legislation,25 and which is applicable 
to some new technologies, is not discussed because it is not applicable to NHTs.26 
Other areas of law that are only very indirectly related to the regulation of NHTs and 
technological risk, such as competition law, are also not discussed.27
There is a related limitation in terms of what is included in the discussion on 
positive integration techniques. The analysis does not encompass all applicable 
EU legislation or indeed all techniques of positive integration. Instead, the dis-
cussion focuses on some of the most important techniques clustered around par-
ticular types of regulatory activity from the inception of an idea through to its 
development and ultimately marketing in the internal market:  stimulating and 
steering innovation through funding; intellectual property law and the fostering 
of technological development; regulating research processes; and finally product 
one ATMP has been authorized by the EMA, ChondroCelect (this is a tissue- engineered product 
for which TiGenex gained EU marketing authorization on 5 October 2009). For discussion, see 
Mahalatchimy, ‘Access to Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products in the EU: Where Do We Stand?’, 
18 European Journal of Health Law (2011) 305.
22 EMA, Reflection Paper on Nanotechnology- Based Medicinal Products for Human Use, EMEA/ 
CHMP/ 79769/ 2006, uses the term ‘nanomedicinal product’. Moreover see Dorbeck- Jung et  al. 
(eds), ‘Governing Nanomedicine:  Lessons from within, and for, the EU Medical Technology 
Regulatory Framework’, 33 (Special Issue 2) Law and Policy (2011) 215– 303.
23 E.g. recombinant insulin and growth hormone (defined as ‘biotechnology medicines’) have 
been on the market in the EU since the 1980s.
24 For examples, see N. Hoppe, ‘Human Tissue- Derived Health Products: The Problems of EU 
Law’ and B. Dorbeck- Jung, ‘Therapeutic Nanoproducts as Drivers of Legal Governance Innovation 
in the European Union’, both in Flear et al. (eds), supra note 11.
25 Regulation (EC) 1907/ 2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, Amending 
Directive 1999/ 45/ EC and Repealing Regulation (EEC) 793/ 93 and Regulation (EC) 1488/ 94 
as well as Directive 76/ 769/ EEC and Directives 91/ 155/ EEC, 93/ 67/ EEC, 93/ 105/ EC and 2000/ 
21/ EC, OJ 2006 L 136/ 3; Directive 2006/ 121/ EC Amending Directive 67/ 548/ EEC on the 
Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Classification, 
Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances in order to Adapt it to Regulation (EC) 1907/ 
2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH) and Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, OJ 2006 L 136/ 281.
26 See Art. 2(5)(a) Regulation (EC) 1907/ 2006, ibid., which states that the REACH legislation 
does not apply to the extent that a substance is used in medicinal products and Art. 2(6), which 
states that it does not apply to medical devices, covered by the leges speciales discussed in this chapter.
27 E.g. anti- monopoly laws can determine the feasibility of research into NHTs, see Hancher, 
‘The EU Pharmaceuticals Market: Parameters and Pathways’, in E. Mossialos et al. (eds), Health 
Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of EU Law and Policy (2010).
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safety as a continuing concern.28 The techniques falling within these types of 
activity (which are to some extent overlapping and mutually supportive) are most 
directly related to regulating technological risk instantiated as product safety or 
supporting those efforts in order to optimize the internal market. The techniques 
deployed at these points of technoscientific development and market availability 
demonstrate and highlight the continuing importance of internal market law to 
the regulation of new technologies.
Overall, in what follows I  underline the way in which internal market law 
continues to play a leading role in the regulation of new and innovative technolo-
gies. In reflection on this core finding, in Section 5 I point to a concern that has 
seemingly been overlooked in extant legal scholarship on new technologies. That 
is, I highlight the (re)alignment, (re)configuration, and (re)orientation of EU law 
to and within market- oriented norms, values, and rationalities that shape techno-
scientific innovation and trajectories. I suggest that this can in turn be explained 
by the way in which EU law and innovation are increasingly tied to the pursuit 
and legitimation of the EU’s project of European integration. In short, EU law 
is connecting with and shaping new technologies, but its focus on product safety 
is about increasing market availability and through it producing a particular 
market- oriented identity for the EU, rather than meeting pressing health needs.
2. Internal Market Law, the Regulation of Technological Risk, 
and the Programmatic Level of Governance
Internal market law remains of central importance to the EU’s regulation of new 
technologies— and that in turn relates to and facilitates the EU’s broader pro-
grammatic priorities. The internal market is defined by Article 26(2) TFEU as 
‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured’.29 New technologies fall principally within the 
free movement of goods.30 Moreover, the internal market is described as ‘one of 
the pillars of the European Union’ and it is situated within the EU’s overarching 
28 There are seven broad types:  funding; protection of intellectual property; regulation of 
research processes; data protection; marketing and product safety legislation; post- market monitor-
ing and surveillance, and product liability; and pricing, reimbursement, and coverage in national 
healthcare systems. The selection is drawn from and reorganizes material from across these types. 
See further Bache, Flear, and Hervey, ‘The Defining Features of the European Union’s Approach to 
Regulating New Health Technologies’, in Flear et al. (eds), supra note 11.
29 The establishment of the internal market is required by Art. 3(3) Treaty on European 
Union (TEU).
30 Arts 28– 36 TFEU. E.g. pharmaceuticals are a good for these purposes, i.e. ‘products which 
can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial trans-
actions’ (Case 7/ 68, Commission v. Italy (Art Treasures case), [1968] ECR 423 (ECLI:EU:C:1968:51)). 
Goods must also ‘possess tangible physical characteristics’ (Advocate General Fennelly in Case C- 
97/ 98, Jägerskiöld v. Gustafsson, [1999] ECR I- 7319 (ECLI:EU:C:1999:515)). So, the organization 
of lotteries does not constitute an activity relating to goods (Case C- 275/ 92, Customs Excise v. 
Schindler, [1994] ECR I- 1039 (ECLI:EU:C:1994:119)).
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architecture and objectives that are reflective of its imagined socio- technical order 
and directed at perpetuating its integration project: ‘[t] he internal market is essen-
tial for prosperity, growth and employment in the EU, contributing to the achievement 
of its objectives under the Lisbon strategy. As an integrated, open and competitive 
area, it in fact promotes mobility, competitiveness and innovation, interacting in 
particular with the EU sectoral policies’.31
Under the Lisbon Strategy32 research was presented as ‘the driver for the 
production and exploitation of knowledge [making it] above all a linchpin in the 
implementation of the Lisbon strategy to make Europe the most dynamic and 
competitive, knowledge- based economy in the world, capable of sustaining eco-
nomic growth, employment and social cohesion’33 by 2010. EU funding of proj-
ects in new technologies, especially in relation to research and development was, 
and as I discuss later continues to be, seen as integral to the creation of a European 
Research Area, which aims to ‘reinvigorate research in Europe’,34 and is linked 
to the Lisbon Strategy as part of the so- called ‘knowledge triangle’ of research, 
education, and innovation.35 Importantly, while EU funding is limited by the 
principle of ‘European added value’,36 it is directed at enabling discourse between 
researchers in different Member States in order to foster economic competitive-
ness of European industry, and integration.37
The Lisbon Strategy was subsequently refocused on growth and jobs,38 linking 
research and development of new technologies even more closely to the central 
goal of economic optimization. In 2010 this refocusing was intensified in the 
light of the recent global (and European) financial and economic crisis in the 
European Commission’s ‘Europe 2020’ strategy for economic growth.39 Further, 
references to health in Europe 2020 bolster the link between it and the economy. 
31 Internal Market:  General Framework, available at http:// europa.eu/ legislation_ summaries/ 
internal_ market/ internal_ market_ general_ framework/ index_ en.htm (last visited 22 December 
2016) (emphasis added).
32 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions— Lisbon European Council, 23rd and 
24th March (2000). See Armstrong, ‘Governance and Constitutionalism After Lisbon’ in JCMS 
Symposium: EU Governance After Lisbon, 46 Journal of Common Market Studies (2008) 413, at 
413– 414.
33 European Commission, Building the ERA of Knowledge for Growth, COM(2005) 118 final, 
at 2 (emphasis added).
34 European Commission, Towards a European Research Area, COM(2000) 6 final, at 5.
35 European Commission, Putting Knowledge into Practice: A Broad- based Innovation Strategy 
for the EU, COM(2006) 502 final.
36 E.g. Decision 1982/ 2006 Concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European 
Community for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (2007– 2013), 
OJ 2006 L 412/ 1.
37 Gusma’o, ‘Research Networks as a Means of European Integration’, 23 Technology in Science 
(2003) 386.
38 W. Kok, Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment. Report from the 
High Level Group Chaired by Wim Kok (2004).
39 See, generally Europe 2020, available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ europe2020/ index_ en.htm (last 
visited 22 December 2016). Also see European Commission, Smart Regulation in the European 
Union, COM (2010) 543 final; European Commission, Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation 
Union, COM (2010) 546 final.
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In particular, given its importance in terms of the discussion to which we will 
return in due course, health is given a specific mention in the strategy’s broad 
objectives. For example, health is integral to smart and inclusive growth because, 
inter alia, ‘keeping people healthy and active for longer has a positive impact on 
productivity and competitiveness’. Moreover, the drive for innovation is noted as 
helping to ‘make the healthcare sector more sustainable and find new cures for 
health conditions’. In addition, as health ‘employs 1 in 10 of the most qualified 
workers in the EU’, it contributes to improving work skills and creating employ-
ment. Finally, the potential impact of the increase in older people also justifies the 
emphasis on health, since ‘financing rising healthcare costs and access to a digni-
fied and independent life for the aging population will be central to the political 
debate’.40
The Innovation Union,41 one of Europe 2020’s flagship initiatives, is particu-
larly revealing in that it ‘aims to maximise the EU’s capacity for innovation and 
research and channel it towards societal challenges. The Commission aims to 
make the EU a world- leader in developing innovative ways to promote active and 
healthy ageing— a challenge common to all European countries.’42 Noteworthy 
here is how innovation is linked to research, and this is then directed at societal 
challenges, but these are used to promote the optimization of ageing; i.e. an age-
ing population is to be an economically active one that contributes towards the 
wider economy. Improving the sustainability of social and healthcare systems is 
part of this set of linked objectives, but the direct link to economic optimization 
reveals this to be the ultimate aim of societal optimization including in relation to 
health. It is to: ‘boost and improve the competitiveness of the markets for inno-
vative products and services that respond to the ageing challenge both at EU and 
global level, thus creating new opportunities for businesses’.43 Returning to inter-
nal market law, these efforts are clearly directly relevant. In furthering the goal of 
economic optimization, so that EU citizens and businesses ‘can make the most of 
the advantages of the single market’, the EU ‘concentrates on dismantling barriers 
still impeding its operation. It seeks to harmonize legislation in order to improve its 
response to the challenges of globalisation and to adapt to advances, such as the new 
technologies’.44
The barriers that are the subject of this drive towards harmonization arise prin-
cipally from laws and wider measures promulgated and produced at the Member 
State level. All EU Member States regulate new technologies in order to reduce 
their attendant risks and maximize their benefits. As Brownsword explains, regu-
lators ‘need to tailor their interventions to the perceived risk profile presented by 
a particular technology.’45 This involves determining matters such as when risk 
40 Europe 2020— for a Healthier EU, available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ health/ europe_ 2020_ 
en.htm (last visited 22 December 2016).
41 Innovation Union, available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ research/ innovation- union/ index_ en.cfm 
(last visited 22 December 2016).
42 Europe 2020— for a Healthier EU, supra note 40 (emphasis added).   43 Ibid.
44 Internal Market: General Framework, supra note 31 (emphasis added).
45 R. Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (2008), at 118.
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arises (whether it is when the technology fails, or is abused— or works); the degree 
of risk (low or high); the kind of harms or hazards to which the risk pertains 
(physical, environmental, social, economic, moral, and political) and the potential 
for their ranking as more or less serious; and, finally, how risk relates to precau-
tion (whether precaution occurs at risk assessment or somehow operates in risk 
management).46 Generating a risk profile for new technologies depends on the 
specific technology in question and there are related questions about whether to 
regulate at all and, if so, the form, type, and extent of regulation. The problems 
for legal and regulatory decision- making are exacerbated where there is scientific 
uncertainty or even a lack of knowledge as well as (and often related to) broader 
disagreement about the factors that can or should go together in building a risk 
profile— raising questions about how risks ‘should be framed, which methodolo-
gies should be adopted, [and] which values prioritized’.47
The central problem for internal market law is the potential for disparate 
national attempts to regulate the risks posed by new technologies, which would 
erect barriers, fragment the internal market, and undermine the interpenetration 
of trade— and ultimately the production and legitimation of the EU’s identity, 
socio- technical order based on a competitive and innovative economy, and its core 
project of European integration. Consequently, the EU seeks to dismantle barriers 
through complementary techniques of negative integration and positive integra-
tion, and as we shall see in different albeit related ways both of these engage with 
the risk posed by new technologies.
3. Negative Integration: Free Movement, Mutual Recognition, 
Justification of National Measures Subject to Proportionality, 
and the Necessity of (Minimum) Harmonization
A.  Free Movement
In terms of negative integration, the relevant Treaty provisions target and prohibit 
both fiscal48 and non- fiscal barriers. The latter are more important for this chapter 
given that outright bans on products or regulation of their salient features, means 
of distribution, and marketing are more likely (as demonstrated by the examples 
noted below). In that regard Article 34 TFEU provides that ‘[q] uantitative restric-
tions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited 
between Member States’. In interpreting this provision, and indeed the others 
that relate to internal market law,49 the Court of Justice of the European Union 
46 Ibid., at 118– 119. 47 Ibid., at 119– 120.
48 These include ‘customs duties and charges having equivalent effect’ prohibited under Art. 28 
TFEU and in order to underpin a customs union with a common external tariff barrier and the 
prohibition on ‘discriminatory internal taxation’ under Art. 110 TFEU.
49 Arts 56– 62 TFEU for services, Arts 45– 48 TFEU for workers, Arts 49– 55 TFEU for estab-
lishment, and Arts 63– 66 TFEU for capital.
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(CJEU) has been mindful of its significance for the telos of European integration 
project in terms of both its production and its legitimation,50 and with that in 
mind has adopted a purposive or teleological interpretation,51 i.e. one that liter-
ally seeks to engender integration through law.52 This can be seen in the CJEU’s 
expansive definition of quantitative restrictions (QRs) as ‘measures which amount 
to a total or partial restraint of, according to the circumstances, imports, exports, 
or goods in transit’.53
This was followed by the even more wide- ranging and all- encompassing defini-
tion of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (MEQRs) 
with the Dassonville judgment ruling that they comprise ‘all trading rules enacted 
by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actu-
ally or potentially, intra- Community trade’.54 Subsequently Cassis de Dijon clari-
fied what Dassonville implied: MEQRs include national measures that make no 
distinction between domestically produced and imported goods, i.e. product 
requirements, in particular because they can impose a further regulatory burden 
on goods imported from another Member State and produced in accordance with 
its standards.55 In Keck there was a further refinement of the scope of Article 34 
TFEU such that ‘certain selling arrangements’56 were found to fall outside it.57
50 M. Adams and H. de Waele (eds), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of 
the European Court of Justice (2013).
51 Koopmans, ‘The Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice’, in D. O’Keeffe and A. 
Bavasso (eds), Judicial Review in EU Law (2000); A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe 
(2004).
52 M. Cappelletti et al. (eds), Integration through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience 
(1986).
53 Case 2/ 73, Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Rizi, [1973] ECR 865 (ECLI:EU:C:1973:89).
54 Case 8/ 74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837 (ECLI:EU:C:1974:82).
55 Case 120/ 78, Rewe- Zentrale AG (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649 (ECLI:EU:C:1979:42).
56 Joined Cases C- 267 and 268/ 91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I- 6097 
(ECLI:EU:C:1993:905), at para. 16 (emphasis added).
57 That is, provided the measures applied universally and are neutral in effect. The meas-
ures in question must ‘apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and 
so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic prod-
ucts and of those from other Member States’ (ibid.). See, e.g., Joined Cases C- 401 and C- 402/ 
92, Tankstation, [1994] ECR I- 2199 (ECLI:EU:C:1994:220); Case C- 292/ 92, Hünermund, 
[1993] ECR I- 6787 (ECLI:EU:C:1993:932); Joined Cases C- 69 and 258/ 93, Punto Casa, [1994] 
ECR I- 2355 (ECLI:EU:C:1994:226); Joined Cases C- 418– 421, 460– 462 and 464/ 93, 9– 11 and 
14– 15/ 94, Semeraro Casa Uno, [1996] ECR I- 2975 (ECLI:EU:C:1996:242). An alternative mar-
ket access- based test was put forward in the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C- 412/ 
93, Leclerc- Siplec, [1995] ECR I- 179 (ECLI:EU:C:1995:26). However, CJEU judgments have 
pursued a related route of ensuring neutrality in the effects of selling arrangements, which leads 
to an analysis of whether relevant national measures inhibit market access, and if they do, the 
measure falls back within Art. 34 TFEU as an MEQR that might be saved in the usual way. See, 
e.g., Cases C- 34– 36/ 95, De Agostini, [1997] ECR I- 3843 (ECLI:EU:C:1997:344); Case C- 405/ 
98, Gourmet International Products, [2001] ECR I- 1795 (ECLI:EU:C:2001:135); Case C- 254/ 98, 
TK- Heimdienst, [2000] ECR I- 151 (ECLI:EU:C:2000:12); Case C- 322/ 01, DocMorris, [2003] ECR 
I- 14887 (ECLI:EU:C:2003:664). There are, however, exceptions where the market access test has 
been preferred: Case C- 441/ 04, A- Punkt, [2006] ECR I- 2093 (ECLI:EU:C:2006:141) (catching 
(truly because not just legally, but also factually) non- discriminatory selling arrangements) and 
cf. Case C- 108/ 09, Ker- Optika, [2010] ECR I- 12213 (ECLI:EU:C:2010:725) and Case 439/ 09, 
Pierre Fabre Dermo- Cosmétique SAS, [2011] ECR I- 9419 (ECLI:EU:C:2011:649), both concerning 
Member State rules on distribution contracts, which were deemed contrary to the Treaty provisions 
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In addition, the CJEU developed mutual recognition as the central regulatory 
principle in Cassis de Dijon.58 There were several drivers behind this development, 
inter alia economic malaise and disaffection with the slow pace of European 
market integration, and the limited capacity of the CJEU and national courts 
(adjudicating on EU law matters) to deal with a potentially burdensome caseload 
prompted by the wide range of measures falling foul of the Treaty. Mutual recog-
nition provides that goods that are lawfully marketed in one Member State are to 
be allowed to circulate throughout the internal market; in other words, there is a 
presumption in favour of free movement. This regulatory approach maximizes the 
autonomy of national regulators, but they must also have regard to and trust their 
counterparts in other Member States, with whom they must cooperate.59 Mutual 
recognition also provides the scope for regulatory competition and a wider range 
of new technologies (with different risk profiles) to be produced and sold within 
the internal market.60 That is because the principle of mutual recognition per-
mits a multiplicity of national approaches to regulating technological risk. The 
approaches adopted might go beyond product safety to encompass different kinds 
and understandings of harms or hazards that are not necessarily focused on prod-
uct safety.
B.  Derogations and Justifications
Nevertheless, the principle of mutual recognition is subject to limitation and that 
is because it remains possible for national regulators to limit the free movement 
of goods from other Member States where there are acceptable reasons for doing 
so (from the point of view of internal market law). In this regard national regu-
lators can use the Treaty- based derogations in Article 36 TFEU to justify and 
preserve measures that are found to be QRs or MEQRs. In addition, objective 
public interest justifications created by the CJEU in Cassis de Dijon and added 
to in subsequent cases are available to save MEQRs that constitute either indis-
tinctly applicable (and often indirectly discriminatory) or non- discriminatory 
hindrances to market access.61 As such, it remains possible for national regulators 
on goods because they undermined free movement. For a potential remoteness test, i.e. a meas-
ure that has an insignificant effect on market access, see Case C- 20/ 03, Burmanjer, [2005] ECR 
I- 4133 (ECLI:EU:C:2005:307). There appears to be a recent move to capture ‘any other measure’ 
which is neither a product requirement nor a selling arrangement, but prohibiting or (severely) 
restricting the use of goods, see Case C- 110/ 05, Commission v. Italy (Trailers), [2009] ECR I- 519 
(ECLI:EU:C:2009:66) (concerning the prohibition of motorcycles from pulling trailers); Case C- 
142/ 05, Mickelsson, [2009] ECR I- 4273 (ECLI:EU:C:2009:336) (a limitation on the use of per-
sonal watercraft only on general navigable waterways).
58 Case 120/ 78, Cassis de Dijon, supra note 55.
59 The ‘principle of sincere cooperation’ in Art. 4(3) TEU.
60 Armstrong, ‘Mutual Recognition’, in J. Scott and C. Barnard (eds), Law of the Single European 
Market: Unpacking the Premises (2002).
61 The move from a discrimination model to a market access model of what constitutes a ‘restric-
tion’ is indicative of the CJEU’s choice to regulate the internal market in a particular way via neg-
ative integration. For discussion see M. P. Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and 
the European Economic Constitution (1998).
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to regulate technological risk, but only to the extent that their free movement 
restrictive measures can be justified by grounds found in these derogations and 
justifications. Importantly, this means that the reasons for the adoption of a mea-
sure at the national level might not fit into the accepted categories of derogations 
and justifications: for the purposes of EU internal market law, national reasons 
are not necessarily acceptable justifications for restrictions on free movement. In 
addition, successful recourse to the derogations and justifications is subject to 
an assessment that the national measures adopted and that are restrictive of free 
movement are proportionate to the regulatory aims pursued. Since a national 
measure that conflicts with directly effective EU free movement law must be dis-
applied unless it can be saved by a derogation or justification, the kinds of harms 
or hazards that can be subject to (legitimate) regulation by the Member States is 
effectively constrained.
To summarize the derogations and justifications, Article 36 TFEU provides 
that Article 34 TFEU:62 ‘shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or 
public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants’.63 
It is conceivable that national regulation of new technologies might be justified on 
any of these finite grounds— and in the following I assume for the moment that 
there are no legislative harmonization measures. To focus on NHTs, the ground 
of public morality is in principle available to Member States in order to justify a 
prohibition on the marketing of products containing, consisting, or derived from, 
for example, embryonic stem cells.64 In relation to the latter ground, it remains 
‘for each Member State to determine in accordance with its own scale of values 
and in the form selected by it the requirements of public morality in its territory’.65 
Consistency in the treatment of domestically and imported goods is essential for 
the successful use of this derogation66 (just as it is for the others).
Although not necessarily useful as a way of justifying national measures regu-
lating NHTs that are restrictive of free movement, public security remains impor-
tant for the justification of national regulation of wider new technologies. Indeed, 
it is conceivable that, for instance, new information and communication tech-
nologies might have a ‘dual use’ (i.e. having both military and civilian uses)67 and 
could therefore be strategically sensitive to both the internal and external security 
of the state. Hence in Richardt the CJEU found that bubble memory circuits 
imported from the United States (US) into one Member State and then another, 
62 As well as Art. 35 TFEU which prohibits quantitative restrictions on exports and all measures 
having equivalent effect.
63 It continues ‘the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property’.
64 Cf. the discussion on marketing and product safety and public morality as an exceptional 
ground for limiting free movement under harmonization, see Section 4D.
65 Case 34/ 79, Henn and Darby, [1979] ECR 3795 (ECLI:EU:C:1979:295), at para. 15 (empha-
sis added).
66 Case 121/ 85, Conegate, [1986] ECR 1007 (ECLI:EU:C:1986:114).
67 Case C- 70/ 94, Fritz Werner, [1995] ECR I- 3189 (ECLI:EU:C:1995:328).
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where they would then be exported to Russia, could be subject to inspection in 
the second Member State in order to verify the nature of the goods.68 To take a 
contemporary example, in the wake of the massacre of journalists of the Charlie 
Hebdo satirical magazine in Paris, the British Prime Minister suggested that in 
his view it was not acceptable that ordinary people could use mobile applications 
or ‘apps’ and other devices in order to have conversations on which the security 
services were unable to eavesdrop. A national measure to overcome this problem 
could involve requiring app developers to build backdoors into their software that 
permit the interception of messages by authorities or an outright ban on the app.69 
Public security might be put forward in order to justify such measures where they 
produce barriers to the free movement of apps between Member States.70
Moving to consider the potential use of public health to save measures that 
regulate NHTs and fall foul of Article 34 TFEU (and again assuming the absence 
of EU harmonization legislation), one example is a ban on the use of the plastic 
di (2- ethyhexyl) phthalate (DEHP) in medical devices due to fears that it is likely 
to be carcinogenic (i.e. that it causes cancer). France in fact banned such products 
where used on paediatric, neonatal, and maternity units through a law that came 
into force on 1 July 2015 and (at the time of writing) the United Kingdom (UK) 
is considering the evidence for introducing a ban.71 To give one other example, 
Member States might seek to ban direct- to- consumer genetic testing products 
that do not involve supervision by a medical professional (a ban on the provision 
of services based on the data produced by such products would likely fall to be 
considered within the free movement of services72). For instance, one such prod-
uct, 23andme, has been banned in the US by the Food and Drug Administration 
on the grounds of public health,73 but after a number of changes to deal with 
those concerns this product is now being marketed in the UK.74 Other EU 
Member States might argue that such products lead to, say, excessive, irrational, 
or wasteful use of public resources, or incorrect diagnosis when (as such products 
usually promise) diagnosis can be carried out without the supervision of the medi-
cal profession.
68 Case C- 367/ 89, Richardt, [1991] ECR I- 4621 (ECLI:EU:C:1991:376).
69 ‘David Cameron in “Cloud Cuckoo Land” Over Encrypted Messaging Apps Ban’, The 
Guardian, 13 January 2015.
70 In addition to public security, Art. 346(1)(b) TFEU provides that Member States can take 
measures in the interests of their security where they relate to the production of or trade in arms, 
munitions, and war material. Such measures must not adversely affect the conditions of competition 
in the internal market for goods that are not intended for military purposes.
71 Warning Over Plastics Used in Treating Premature Babies, BBC News, 13 November 2014, 
available at http:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ health- 30034760 (last visited 22 December 2016).
72 Here the provision of services is likely to be seen as the main activity, with the free move-
ment of goods being ancillary (on this point see Case C- 275/ 92, Customs Excise v. Schindler, supra 
note 30).
73 Food and Drug Administration, 23andMe, Inc. 11/ 22/ 13, available at http:// www.fda.
gov/ ICECI/ EnforcementActions/ WarningLetters/ 2013/ ucm376296.htm (last visited 22 
December 2016).
74 Controversial DNA Test Comes to UK, BBC News, 2 December 2014, available at http:// www.
bbc.co.uk/ news/ science- environment- 30285581 (last visited 22 December 2016).
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Public health grounds were argued in DocMorris where the CJEU stated that 
‘the health and life of humans rank foremost among the assets or interests pro-
tected by [Art. 36 TFEU]’ and ‘it is for the Member States, within the limits 
imposed by the Treaty, to decide what degree of protection they wish to assure’.75 
In DocMorris that meant a prohibition on internet sales of non- prescription drugs 
could not be justified. In contrast, a prohibition could be justified with respect 
to prescription drugs since there was a need to check the authenticity of doctors’ 
prescriptions to ensure the medicine reached the patient either directly or via an 
authorized person, and to prevent problems arising from the use of different lan-
guages (such as purchasing the wrong medicine or incorrect use). Concerns over 
DEHP or the unsupervised use of genetic testing technologies and the interpre-
tation of their results are therefore likely to provide reasonable grounds for reg-
ulatory interventions at the Member State level and attempts to justify them on 
public health grounds.
Public policy (which is not the same as the public interest justifications avail-
able as mandatory requirements) is restrictively interpreted76 and has not usually 
succeeded as a stand- alone defence, except in order to ‘protect … the fundamen-
tal interests of the State’,77 and has instead been more successful when used in 
combination with other derogations, such as public health.78 Further concerns 
about genetic testing technologies may arise and be articulated in terms of public 
policy, such as where the capacity to test for certain diseases is deemed problem-
atic because it might produce genetic discrimination or compound existing differ-
ent treatment of affected individuals or groups.79
As for the objective public interest justifications, the CJEU has, for example, 
identified the ‘effectiveness of fiscal supervision, protection of public health, fair-
ness of commercial transactions, [and] defence of the consumer’80 as starting 
points for the non- exhaustive range of mandatory requirements (with similar 
objective public interests being developed in relation to the other freedoms81). 
Consequently, where Member State measures such as the examples noted earlier are 
indistinctly applicable or non- discriminatory it becomes possible to justify them 
on the basis of objective public interest justifications that overlap with the dero-
gations in Article 36 TFEU or on additional public interest grounds. Consumer 
protection is one such ground, yet while it might seem an appropriate justifica-
tion for measures that aim to regulate technological risk, the protection of public 
health has been more widely used in such cases.82 In addition, the environment 
75 Case C- 322/ 01, DocMorris, supra note 57, at para. 103 (emphasis added).
76 Case 177/ 83, Ringelhan, [1984] ECR 3651 (ECLI:EU:C:1984:334).
77 Case 7/ 78, Thompson, [1978] ECR 2247 (ECLI:EU:C:1978:209), at para. 34.
78 Case C- 434/ 04, Ahokainen, [2006] ECR I- 9171 (ECLI:EU:C:2006:609), at para. 28.
79 For discussion see Montgomery, ‘Strategies of Regulation: Illustrations from the Work of the 
Human Genetics Commission’, in Flear et al., supra note 11.
80 Case 120/ 78, Cassis de Dijon, supra note 55, at para. 8.
81 See further: Barnard, supra note 14, ch. 13.
82 The following cases were not concerned with safeguarding consumers against technological 
risk but demonstrate its potential to justify national measures by analogy: Case 178/ 84, Commission 
v. Germany (Beer Purity), [1987] ECR 1227 (ECLI:EU:C:1987:126) (ensuring beer purity); Case 
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has been recognized as an objective public interest that is worthy of protection as 
a mandatory requirement,83 although it is less clear whether it is protected under 
Article 36 TFEU (in terms of animal or plant health).84 Given that several EU 
Member States have banned the growth of seeds that are classed as genetically 
modified organisms (often simply referred to as GMOs) and most often used in 
food production, it is not inconceivable that protection of the environment or 
indeed public health might be used to justify a ban on the importation of prod-
ucts derived from those sources such as vaccines produced by specially engineered 
plants.85
C.  Proportionality
The limitations on the prohibition of restrictions on the free movement of goods 
are, as noted earlier, subject to the principle of proportionality. In DocMorris the 
CJEU described proportionality in the following way:
national rules or practices likely to have a restrictive effect, or having such an effect, on the 
importation of pharmaceutical products are compatible with the Treaty only to the extent 
that they are necessary for the effective protection of health and life of humans. A national 
rule or practice cannot benefit from the derogation provided for in [Art. 36 TFEU] if the 
health and life of humans may be protected just as effectively by measures which are less 
restrictive of intra- Community trade.86
Thus, even where the risk profile of the specific technology at issue provides 
reasons for its regulation on the grounds of the protection of public health, the 
measures adopted by national regulation must be the least restrictive to free 
C- 315/ 92, Clinique, [1994] ECR I- 317 (ECLI:EU:C:1994:34) (preventing consumers from being 
misled into believing that Clinique was selling medicinal as opposed to cosmetic products); Case 
C- 470/ 93, Mars, [1995] ECR I- 1923 (ECLI:EU:C:1995:224) (similar to the latter case, this one 
was to do with preventing consumers from being misled into believing a chocolate bar was bigger 
than it was, i.e., due to a ‘+10 free’ that was larger than the size of the chocolate bar it covered). 
Decision 1082/ 2013/ EU on serious cross- border threats to health and repealing Decision 2119/ 98/ 
EC, OJ 2013 L 293/ 1 applies and further shapes the exercise of Member State discretion in terms 
of the regulatory interventions adopted in order to tackle and ameliorate the threat. Member States 
are required to communicate their plans prior to serious cross- border threats, notify any changes to 
their plans especially in the event of the emergency arising, and finally to explain and justify their 
responses (entailing consideration of their proportionality).
83 E.g. see Case 142/ 05, Mickelsson, supra note 57 (restricting the use of jet skis on inland water-
ways seemed to be justified on environmental protection grounds).
84 E.g. contrast the justification of stricter standards for aircraft registered in another Member 
State than for domestic aircraft on the basis of ‘public health and environmental protection’ 
(Case C- 378/ 96, Aher- Waggon, [1998] ECR I- 4473 (ECLI:EU:C:1998:357), at para. 19; see also 
Case C- 379/ 98, PreussenElektra, [2001] ECR I- 2099 (ECLI:EU:C:2001:160)) with the finding 
that ‘the protection of the environment cannot serve to justify any restriction on exports, par-
ticularly in the case of waste destined for recovery’ (Case C- 209/ 98, FFAD, [2000] ECR I- 3743 
(ECLI:EU:C:2000:279), at para. 48).
85 Paul and Ma, ‘Plant- Made Pharmaceuticals: Leading Products and Production Platforms’, 58 
Biotechnology and Applied Biochemistry (2011) 58.
86 Case C- 322/ 01, DocMorris, supra note 57, at para. 104.
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movement. Public health is particularly salient to the regulation of technological 
risk. The enduring concern of the CJEU in shaping and applying the proportion-
ality assessment in relation to this reason for limiting free movement, perhaps 
more so than for the other possible reasons, has been its possible misuse. In other 
words, the CJEU has been careful to ensure that public health and the other jus-
tifications available under Article 36 TFEU or as mandatory requirements are not 
used, in the words of that provision, as ‘a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States’.87
Consequently, resort to public health as a reason for maintaining Member State 
regulation of technological risk requires evidence of genuine health concerns that 
in the case of challenge is carefully scrutinized by the CJEU. In Medicinal Herbs 
the CJEU explained it needed a ‘detailed assessment, on a case by case basis, of the 
risk alleged by the Member State invoking [Art. 36 TFEU]’.88 In the case of medi-
cal devices containing DEHP, for instance, any challenge to and defence of the 
French ban on such products (again assuming the absence of EU harmonization 
legislation) could make use of the EU’s own assessment, which classifies DEHP 
as possibly carcinogenic to humans.89 In Frans- Nederlandse Maatschappij voor 
Biologische Producten (Frans- Nederlandse) the CJEU found that, in the absence 
of harmonization, where there are uncertainties in the present state of scientific 
research it is for the Member States to decide what degree of protection of the 
health and life of humans they intend to assure. As such, in that case ‘a Member 
State is not prohibited from requiring plant protection products to be subject 
to prior approval, even if those products have already been approved in another 
Member State’.90
Sandoz concerned the addition of certain vitamins, in particular vitamins 
A and D, to muesli bars and analeptic beverages. The CJEU found the internal 
market principles also applied to them as:
substances … which are not as a general rule harmful in themselves but may have special 
harmful effects solely if taken to excess as part of the general nutrition, the composition of 
which is unforeseeable and cannot be monitored. In view of the uncertainties inherent in the 
scientific assessment, national rules prohibiting, without prior authorisation, the marketing of 
87 Seen in Case 40/ 82, Commission v.  United Kingdom (Turkeys), [1984] ECR 0283 
(ECLI:EU:C:1984:33) in which the CJEU held the ‘real aim of the 1981 measures [in which there 
was a slaughter policy applied to flocks infected with Newcastle disease and a ban on the importa-
tion of poultry meat and eggs from all other Member States except Denmark and Ireland] was to 
block, for commercial and economic reasons, imports … in particular from France’, from where 
there has been a huge increase in imports (at para. 37). In relation to public morality, see Case 34/ 
79, Henn and Darby, supra note 65.
88 Case C- 88/ 07, Commission v.  Spain (Medicinal Herbs), [2009] ECR I- 1353 
(ECLI:EU:C:2008:567), at para. 93 (emphasis added).
89 Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly- Identified Health Risks, Preliminary Opinion on 
the Safety of Medical Devices Containing DEHP Plasticised PVC or Other Plasticisers on Neonates and 
Other Groups Possibly At Risk (2014 update), available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ health/ scientific_ com-
mittees/ emerging/ docs/ scenihr_ o_ 047.pdf (last visited 22 December 2016).
90 Case 272/ 80, Frans- Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Producten, [1981] ECR 3277 
(ECLI:EU:C:1981:312), at para. 16.
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foodstuffs to which vitamins have been added are justified on principle within the meaning of 
Art. 36 of the Treaty on grounds of the protection of human health.91
As this example illustrates, a precautionary approach can be adopted for the jus-
tification of measures under public health.92 Following a detailed assessment that 
reveals the persistence of uncertainty regarding the extent of the risk to human 
health, Member States do not have to wait for the reality and seriousness of tech-
nological risk to be fully demonstrated before protective measures can be taken.93
However, in departing from the prohibition on restrictions on the free move-
ment of goods (or indeed the other freedoms) Member States must have continu-
ing regard to the requirements of free movement, in particular that in order to be 
justified the measure in question must be proportionate to the objective pursued. 
As the CJEU put it in Frans- Nederlandse:
The authorities of the importing state are however not entitled unnecessarily to require tech-
nical or chemical analyses or laboratory tests when the same analyses and tests have already 
been carried out in another Member State and their results are available to those authori-
ties or may at their request be placed at their disposal.94
In this way, mutual recognition requires that Member States do not duplicate the 
regulatory interventions of other Member States. Where there is such duplication 
it is likely to be found disproportionate— or even a disguised restriction on trade.
The importance of free movement subject to proportionate limits was also 
echoed in the CJEU’s affirmation of this ruling in Sandoz, where it held that 
scientific uncertainty did not provide Member States with unlimited discretion. 
Rather, proportionality ‘requires that the power of the Member States to prohibit 
imports of the products in question from other Member States should be restricted 
to what is necessary to attain the legitimate aim of protecting health’.95 That meant 
that there must remain scope for authorizations to market where they are compat-
ible with the need to protect health, that is, where ‘when the addition of vitamins 
to foodstuffs meets a real need, especially a technical or nutritional one’.96
D.  Necessity of (Minimum) Harmonization
Negative integration has proven essential in bringing down barriers to the free 
movement of new technologies (and other goods), not least through mutual rec-
ognition as a central regulatory principle. The limited possibility of justifying 
national measures that are restrictive of free movement subject to proportional-
ity means that the scope of permissible risk regulation is effectively constrained. 
91 Case 174/ 82, Sandoz, [1983] ECR 2445 (ECLI:EU:C:1983:213), at para. 17 (emphasis added).
92 European Commission, Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000) 1 and 
Art. 191 TFEU on the environment.
93 Case C- 192/ 01, Commission v. Denmark, [2003] ECR I- 9693 (ECLI:EU:C:2003:492).
94 Case 272/ 80, Frans- Nederlandse, supra note 90, at para. 16 (emphasis added).
95 Case 174/ 82, Sandoz, supra note 91, at para. 18 (emphasis added).
96 Ibid., at para. 19.
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But this constraint on regulation is not to the extent that the measures adopted 
cannot regulate a more diverse range of harms or hazards than those that per-
tain to product safety. Negative integration would be insufficient on its own for 
the achievement of a truly integrated internal market. Indeed, as highlighted by 
the examples noted earlier, although the CJEU has limited the circumstances in 
which Article 36 TFEU and mandatory requirements can be invoked by Member 
States, their use threatens to fragment the internal market. In addition, where 
national regulation is found to be incompatible with free movement law and can-
not be saved, regulatory gaps can emerge. Consequently, national measures that 
survive scrutiny under negative integration as well as those that do not are subject 
to the complementary mode of positive integration. This is classically understood 
as entailing the adoption of legislation at the EU level. However, for the purposes 
of this chapter positive integration encompasses several regulatory techniques in 
addition to legislation. Before detailing those techniques in Section 4 let us briefly 
outline legislation, as the core technique.
As mentioned earlier, Article 114 TFEU provides the main basis for the adoption 
of legislation aimed at the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
The concerns noted earlier over the need to tailor regulatory interventions to the 
perceived risk profile presented by a particular technology therefore also arise at the 
EU level. However, EU interventions are circumscribed by the conditions for the use 
of Article 114 TFEU or indeed any other legal base. These comprise the question of 
whether the competence to regulate is in principle applicable, and the application 
of the principles of subsidiarity (relevant to this as an area of shared competence 
under Article 4(2)(a) TFEU97) and proportionality,98 which pertain to the matters 
of whether the competence can in fact be used and, if so, the extent of permissible 
regulation. In using Article 114 TFEU to regulate technological risk there is a sub-
sidiary requirement in Article 114(3) TFEU which provides that the Commission ‘in 
its proposals … concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of 
any new development based on scientific facts’ (emphasis added). In this way scientific 
and technical knowledge and expertise are underscored and valorized as the founda-
tion and a key justification for EU legislation, which is a key technique for regulating 
the dangers or threats attendant on the circulation of products. Article 114(3) is a 
more specific instantiation of the general requirement under, in particular, Article 9 
TFEU that the ‘the Union shall take into account requirements linked to … a high 
level of … protection of human health’ (emphasis added) in the definition and imple-
mentation of its policies and activities.
Article 114(10) TFEU provides that legislation adopted under that legal basis 
must include a ‘safeguard clause’ in ‘appropriate cases’ that authorizes the Member 
States to take provisional measures subject to EU control ‘for one or more of the 
non- economic reasons referred to in Art. 36’. In addition, it remains possible for 
a Member State to maintain a measure ‘on grounds of major needs referred to in 
97 Art. 5(3) TEU. 98 Art. 5(4) TEU.
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Art. 36 [TFEU], or relating to the protection of the environment or the working 
environment’ on a temporary basis under Article 114(4) TFEU,99 or even intro-
duce ‘after the adoption of the harmonization measure’ a new temporary measure 
based on ‘new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment or 
the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State’ 
under Article 114(5) TFEU.100 In the event that either Article 114(4) or 114(5) 
applies, Article 114(7) TFEU requires the Commission to ‘immediately examine 
whether to propose an adaptation to that [harmonization] measure’.
However, as mentioned above, before Article 114 TFEU can be used it is first 
necessary to demonstrate that the legal base is indeed applicable. In Tobacco 
Advertising I the CJEU found that Article 114 can only be used to adopt a mea-
sure where it is genuinely intended to improve the conditions for the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market and had that effect. Provided that 
is the case, the legislation adopted must either contribute to the elimination of 
obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms constitutive of the internal 
market or contribute to the removal of distortions of competition arising from 
diverse national rules (a broader ground which can serve to justify legislation where 
one Member State regulates but another does not, generating additional costs and 
market fragmentation).101 Since several of the measures regulated by the directive 
at issue in the case did not meet these criteria and the relevant provisions could 
99 Further, in this case the Member State ‘shall notify the Commission of these provisions as 
well as the grounds for maintaining them’.
100 The Member State must ‘notify the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the 
grounds for introducing them’. Art. 114(6) TFEU provides that the Commission ‘shall, within six 
months of the notifications as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve or reject the national provi-
sions involved after having verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not they shall constitute an 
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market’. Approval is automatic where the Commission 
does not make a decision within this period. The Commission is permitted to extend the six- month 
period for a further six months, but only when it is ‘justified by the complexity of the matter and in 
the absence of danger for human health’.
101 Case C- 376/ 98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising I), 
[2000] ECR I- 8419 (ECLI:EU:C:2000:544), which was applied in the follow- up Case C- 380/ 
03, Germany v. European Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising II), [2006] ECR I- 11573 
(ECLI:EU:C:2006:772) and affirmed in Case C- 491/ 01, British American Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd, [2002] ECR I- 11453 (ECLI:EU:C:2002:741). Tobacco Advertising I 
was widely seen as a response to Case C- 300/ 89, Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide), [1991] 
ECR I- 2867 (ECLI:EU:C:1991:244) in which the CJEU preferred Art. 114 TFEU as the basis for 
environmental legislation instead of Art. 192 TFEU (although in other choice of legal bases cases 
the CJEU opted for the more specific basis over Art. 114 TFEU: Case C- 155/ 91, Commission v. 
Council (Waste Directive), [1993] ECR I- 939 (ECLI:EU:C:1993:98); Case C- 269/ 97, Commission 
and Parliament v. Council (Beef Labelling), [2000] ECR I- 2257 (ECLI:EU:C:2000:183)). This 
implied an expansive definition of the internal market (through the marginalization of more spe-
cific legal bases) and arguably usurped the wishes of the Member States as masters and drafters of 
the Treaties, who had denoted Art. 114 TFEU a residual legal basis (with Art. 114(1) TFEU stating 
the provision applies ‘[s] ave where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall 
apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Art. 26’). However, subsequent cases indicate 
the CJEU might be relaxing its interpretation of when Art. 114 TFEU can be used to regulate eco-
nomic life, see e.g., Case C- 210/ 03, Swedish Match, [2004] ECR I- 11893 (ECLI:EU:C:2004:802); 
Case C- 434/ 02, Arnold André, [2004] ECR I- 11825 (ECLI:EU:C:2004:800).
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not be severed, the directive had to be annulled.102 More importantly for the pres-
ent discussion, under this approach disparate national measures that regulate new 
technologies and their various risks (be they physical, environmental, social, eco-
nomic, moral, or political) can easily justify and trigger EU- wide harmonizing leg-
islation (particularly where the CJEU has ruled that a restriction on free movement 
or distortion of the conditions of competition exists). The CJEU noted that exclu-
sion on the adoption of harmonizing legislation in the public health field under 
Article 168(5) TFEU does not mean that legislation adopted under other legal 
bases (such as Art. 114) could not have any impact on the protection of human 
health. The ease with which legislation can be adopted under Article 114 has been 
demonstrated by a subsequent ruling that a revised tobacco advertising direc-
tive that omitted the problematic provisions met the criteria for legislation under 
Article 114.103 Such harmonizing legislation is important for the achievement of 
broader regulatory aims: diverse Member State measures would not only put at 
risk the internal market itself, but they would in turn imperil the production and 
legitimation of the EU’s socio- technical order and project of European integration.
The subsidiary aim of Article 114 TFEU of protecting certain public interests 
(especially health and safety) ensures that EU (re)regulation might not provide 
an exact replacement for diverse Member State measures.104 EU (re)regulation is 
focused on removing obstacles to free movement and distortions of competition, 
and only a narrow range of harms or hazards need to be given particular consid-
eration in proposals for legislation (under Art. 114(3) TFEU), or can remain regu-
lated either by Member State measures adopted as a ‘safeguard’ (under Art. 114(10) 
TFEU), or can be maintained or introduced on a temporary basis where the har-
monization legislation does not provide the requisite protection (under Art. 114(4) 
TFEU and Art. 114(5) TFEU respectively). But these special measures can typi-
cally be justified only on the non- exhaustive grounds provided for under Article 
36 TFEU rather than the objective public interests protected by the mandatory 
requirements. Overall, therefore, Article 114 TFEU reduces the scope of permis-
sible EU risk regulation within the internal market. Article 114 essentially provides 
the foundation for the narrowing of technological risk to product safety matters 
and renders this as the dominant frame for the legislative instruments eventually 
102 Directive 98/ 43/ EC on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions of the Member States Relating to the Advertising and Sponsorship of Tobacco Products, 
OJ 1998 L 213/ 9.
103 Case C- 380/ 03, Tobacco Advertising II, supra note 101, concerning the validity of using Art. 
114 TFEU in order to adopt Directive 2003/ 33 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Relating to the Advertising and Sponsorship of 
Tobacco Products, OJ 2003 L 152/ 16.
104 Reregulation might occur where the EU legislature produces instruments that replace 
Member State measures— simple regulation would occur where there are no such measures to 
replace. Reregulation might be required where the CJEU finds Member State measures in contra-
vention of the free movement provisions and incapable of being saved by a derogation and/ or justi-
fication (or capable of being saved but disproportionate), which means that they must be set aside, 
but with the potential effect of creating a regulatory gap (e.g. where proportionate measures are not 
put in place or cannot be crafted).
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adopted by the EU legislature (as well as the supplementary techniques discussed 
in Section 4). This legal basis also thereby supports the particular market- based 
orientation of the EU’s identity.
In the case of ‘full’ or ‘pre- emptive’ legislative harmonization measures, the 
EU is said to ‘occupy the field’, further national legislation is automatically pre-
cluded, and pre- existing national measures are automatically superseded by the 
new EU law. Yet this approach is now quite rare. The advent of mutual recogni-
tion in the CJEU’s jurisprudence in the 1980s became a central component of the 
Commission proposal105 for the insertion of both the aforementioned Article 26 
TFEU and Article 114 TFEU into the Treaty by the Single European Act, as well 
as a new approach to harmonization that focused on essential technical and safety 
standards106 (and increased choice over the type of legislative instrument available, 
albeit with a long- running preference for the flexibility provided by directives over 
the rigidity of regulations— a preference that is beginning to change, most notably 
in relation to the legislation on clinical trials and medical devices).107
Given this regulatory preference it remains for the CJEU to determine the extent 
to which harmonization covers the field in question and pre- empts Member State 
regulation. In other words, it is for the CJEU to decide whether there is space left 
for autonomous Member State regulation and therefore the continued application 
of (and the necessity of ensuring compliance with) the Treaty principles. As the 
CJEU explained in DocMorris:
[Art. 34] continues to apply in relation to the manufacture and marketing of specialised 
pharmaceutical products as long as harmonization of national rules has not been fully 
achieved in those areas … In that regard, it should be noted that the sale of medicinal 
products to end consumers has not been subject to full Community harmonization.108
Nevertheless, the limits on the application of Article 34 TFEU remain important. 
Elsewhere, in Schwarz the CJEU affirmed its previous rulings on limitations by 
reference to Article 36 TFEU: ‘in the absence of harmonization, [it is for Member 
105 In the following: European Commission, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper, 
COM(85) 310.
106 Council Resolution 85/ C 136/ 01 of 7 May 1985 on a New Approach to Technical 
Harmonization and Standards; European Commission, Communication on Enhancing the 
Implementation of the New Approach Directives, COM(2003) 240 final. For commentary see 
Pelkmans, ‘The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization’, 25(3) Journal 
of Common Market Studies (1987) 249. Legislation is now most commonly adopted under Art. 114 
TFEU. It is easier to adopt legislation under the latter than the alternative (and original) legal basis 
of Art. 115 TFEU, which requires unanimity in the Council of the European Union (by contrast 
Art. 114 TFEU provides for the adoption of legislation under Art. 294 TFEU, the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure, which requires a qualified majority in the Council of the EU and therefore makes 
it easier to adopt legislation).
107 Under Art. 288 TFEU a directive ‘shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form 
and methods’ whereas a regulation ‘shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States’. Art. 114(1) TFEU provides the EU legislature with the 
scope to ‘adopt measures for the approximation’ of Member State measures and therefore includes 
directives and regulations.
108 Case C- 322/ 01, DocMorris, supra note 57, at para. 102.
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States] to decide on their intended level of protection of human health and life, 
always taking into account the requirements of the free movement of goods within 
the Community’.109 In other words, proportionality remains central, which in 
this case meant that a requirement that goods sold from vending machines had to 
be packaged was proportionate to the objective of protecting public health, since 
there was a risk of ‘contamination of the delivery tray by pathogenic germs and 
their transmission onto the goods removed by the customer … [which was] by no 
means merely theoretical’.110
4. Techniques of Positive Integration: Some Examples in  
the Field of New Health Technologies
A.  Stimulating and Steering Innovation through Funding
As noted earlier, legislation adopted under Article 114 TFEU is a key tech-
nique of positive integration, particularly in relation to marketing within the 
internal market. However, there are several others that are salient to the regula-
tion of technological risk prior to marketing and earlier in the technoscience 
product development pipeline. These additional techniques support the cen-
tralization of harms or hazards relating to product safety in legislation, while 
facilitating the marginalization of other kinds of harms or hazards to which 
risk might pertain (physical, environmental, social, economic, moral, or politi-
cal), as well as alternative understandings of risk and framings of regulation. 
In that regard, shaping knowledge through involvement in research is founda-
tional to steering the trajectory of technoscience; knowledge is the foundation 
for the exercise of power and the basis for the production of products and 
services and their regulation. Consequently shaping knowledge through fund-
ing is a core priority within the overarching architecture of EU governance, as 
I mentioned earlier.
Indeed, in the seventh (and final) Framework Programme (FP), FP7,111 even 
basic research— including on health and medical treatments112— was framed as a 
driver of future growth instead of as a means of increasing knowledge and under-
standing per se. The same frame is found in (the current) Horizon 2020.113 And 
this common frame is reflective of the legal basis of each in the EU’s competence 
109 Case C- 366/ 04, Schwarz, [2005] I- 10139 (ECLI:EU:C:2005:719), at para. 32 (emphasis 
added).
110 Ibid., at para. 35. 111 Decision 1982/ 2006/ EC, supra note 36.
112 E.g. nanotechnologies are highlighted in the FP7 objectives, in such references as ‘the devel-
opment and validation of new therapies … diagnostic tools and medical technologies’. See Proposed 
Priorities for Innovative Health Research 2012, available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ research/ health/ pdf/ 
fp7- health- 2012- orientation- paper_ en.pdf (last visited 22 December 2016).
113 Regulation (EU) 1291/ 2013 Establishing Horizon 2020— the Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation (2014– 2020) and Repealing Decision 1982/ 2006/ EC, OJ 2013 L 347/ 104.
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for research and technological development in Article 182(1) TFEU,114 which 
under Article 4(3) TFEU is shared with the Member States. This basis is directed 
at ‘encouraging … [EU research] to become more competitive, including in its indus-
try, while promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other 
Chapters of the Treaties’,115 such as those relating to the internal market and public 
health. Within Horizon 2020 (and FP7 before it), the ‘added value’ (and justifica-
tion) of EU funding is constructed as supporting translational research; i.e. bring-
ing innovations into the internal market.116 In terms of basic research, ‘[r] esearch on 
the brain and related diseases’, nanotechnology, and research on the genes behind 
kidney disease risk,117 are noted as key areas for funding.118 Moreover, EU fund-
ing is partly about reducing the risks attendant to research in new technologies 
(such as the high costs involved), rather than the risk posed by new technologies to 
consumer safety, and helping to support the translation of research into products.
It is Article 168(5) TFEU that provides the legal basis for funding provided 
under the EU’s health programme. Health programme funding is now in its third 
iteration (for 2014– 2020)119 and is limited to supporting actions under Together 
for Health and in turn the priorities of Europe 2020, for which it is noted that 
the ‘promotion of good health at Union level is also an integral part’.120 The focus 
on economic optimization is underlined in statements such as, ‘[i] n line with the 
objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Programme should focus on a set of 
well- defined objectives and actions with clear, proven Union added value, and con-
centrate support on a smaller number of activities in priority areas’.121 Those pri-
ority areas include: promoting health; protecting EU citizens from cross- border 
threats to their health; contributing to the development of health systems that 
are innovative, efficient, and sustainable; and finally, facilitating improvements to 
114 Art. 173(3) TFEU (industry) forms the second basis for Regulation (EU) 1291/ 2013 ibid., 
and Art. 166(1) European Community Treaty (replaced by Art. 182(1) TFEU) forms the sole basis 
for Decision 1982/2006, supra note 36 above.
115 Art. 179(1) TFEU (emphasis added).
116 Defined in Art. 26(2) TFEU as, ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’. The establishment of the internal market is 
required by Art. 3(3) amended TEU.
117 A number of projects contributed towards this research, including ANEUPLOIDY (under-
standing the importance of gene dosage imbalance in human health using genetics, functional 
genomics, and systems biology), EUROSPAN (European special populations research net-
work:  quantifying and harnessing genetic variation for gene discovery), GENECURE (applied 
genomic strategies for treatment and prevention of cardiovascular death in uraemia and end- stage 
renal disease), and EPIC (European prospective investigation into cancer, chronic diseases, nutri-
tion, and lifestyle).
118 European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the 7th 
Framework Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for Nuclear 
Research and Training Activities (2007– 2011) (Presented by the Commission Pursuant to Art. 
250(2) of the EC Treaty), COM/ 2006/ 0364 final.
119 Regulation (EU) 282/ 2014 on the Establishment of a Third Programme for the Union’s 
Action in the Field of Health (2014– 2020) and Repealing Decision 1350/ 2007/ EC, OJ 2014 L 86/ 1.
120 Rec. 2, ibid. 121 Rec. 5, ibid. (emphasis added).
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the safety of and access to healthcare.122 These priorities are, however, framed by 
Europe 2020, and as with Horizon 2020 funding, this is seen in the focus on pro-
moting translational research: ‘The Programme should promote synergies, while 
avoiding duplication with related Union programmes and actions, by promoting, 
where relevant, the uptake of innovative breakthroughs resulting from research in the 
health sector’.123
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) plays 
an important role in justifying funding.124 For example, in its Opinion on the 
Ethical Aspects of Nanomedicine the EGE justifies EU funding and investment into 
research and development and seeks to develop the EU’s nanoregulation through 
the leveraging of risk and scientific uncertainty.125 As Harvey and Salter point 
out, novel science ‘gives bioethical expertise access to new governance territory; 
bioethical expertise gives sciences access to political acceptability’.126 The EGE’s focus 
has been on providing bioethical justification for risk- orientated regulation that 
aims to foster and direct, rather than circumscribe, innovation in new technolo-
gies in general. Indeed, the EGE is an important actor and means of provid-
ing legitimacy and generating support and the more general social licence for 
innovation, especially in areas where social and broader ethical implications of 
new technologies— and not just technological risk defined narrowly as product 
safety— is a pressing public concern.127 The EGE’s role points to the role of expert 
deliberation around bioethics in facilitating the narrowing of the scope and type 
of harms and hazards that are the focus of technological risk regulation to product 
safety.
Overall, funding is a way of regulating through ‘steering’128 rather than ‘com-
mand and control’, in that it is used to stimulate and support the development of 
certain types of NHTs (rather than others), which is particularly important since 
the exercise of EU competence in respect of funding considered here does not 
pre- empt Member State action.129 Funding helps to shape and support research 
priorities throughout the EU and therefore the trajectory of technoscientific prod-
uct development and market availability. Research funding is in turn embedded 
122 Summarized in European Commission, The Third Health Programme 2014- 2020 Funding 
Health Initiatives, available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ health/ programme/ docs/ factsheet_ healthpro-
gramme2014_ 2020_ en.pdf (last visited 22 December 2016).
123 Rec. 21, supra note 119 (emphasis added).
124 E.g. EGE, The Ethics Review of hESC FP7 Research Projects (Opinion No. 22).
125 See, e.g., EGE, Ethical Aspects of Nanomedicine (Opinion No. 21).
126 Harvey and Salter, ‘Anticipatory Governance:  Bioethical Expertise for Human/ Animal 
Chimeras’, 21 Science as Culture (2012) 291, at 309 (emphasis added).
127 Busby, Hervey, and Mohr, ‘Ethical EU Law? The Influence of the European Group on Ethics 
in Science and New Technologies’, 33 European Law Review (2008) 803.
128 This ‘steering’ is what Daintith calls ‘government by dominium’. See:  Daintith, ‘The 
Techniques of Government’, in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (1994).
129 As a reminder, in respect of Horizon 2020 funding, Art. 4(3) TFEU states ‘the exercise 
of … [EU] competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs’. 
Similarly, in respect of health programme funding, Art. 6(a) TFEU provides that it is limited to 
providing support to the Member States.
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within a network that constructs the EU’s identity, and its narrative about itself 
(including in terms of what it regulates, how, and why).130
B.  Intellectual Property Law and the Fostering 
of Technoscientific Development
The EU’s intellectual property law helps to mediate and manage technological risk 
and steer behaviour and the trajectory of technoscience, and it does so through 
the incentive of exclusive intellectual property rights, such as patent protection.131 
By regulating technological risks that relate to harms and hazards highlighted by 
bioethics (and linked to human rights), EU law in this area supports the focus 
on technological risk rendered as product safety seen elsewhere in the product 
development pipeline. A central objective of patent protection under the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions Directive is the stimulation of innova-
tion that, like research funding, recognizes the risks of developing new technolo-
gies and seeks to minimize them. For example, it is noted that ‘in the field of 
genetic engineering, research and development require a considerable amount of 
high- risk investment and therefore only adequate legal protection can make them 
profitable’.132 In other words, pre- emption of diverse Member State patent pro-
tection regimes and the establishment of a single EU regime for biotechnologi-
cal inventions is about trying to mitigate risks to developers rather than to, for 
example, health and safety, i.e. ensuring that those developing inventions have 
their investment of time and research safeguarded, in order that it can be justified 
(usually to private investors or shareholders), and that they rather than a competi-
tor derive the reputational and (especially) the economic benefits (profits).
With Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis of this legislation, patent protection is 
ultimately oriented towards markets and the Directive is justified by the idea that 
differences in the legal protection of biotechnological inventions between Member 
States would create barriers to trade in the internal market.133 Although this ration-
ale was challenged in Netherlands v. Parliament and Council (Biotechnology)134 the 
CJEU found that the Directive ‘in fact aims to protect damage to the internal 
market’.135 In particular, the main justification for harmonization is the need to 
foster and shape the technoscientific development pipeline and through it the 
130 Tourney, ‘Narratives for Nanotech:  Anticipating Public Reactions to Nanotechnology’, 8 
Techne (2004) 88.
131 Odell- West, ‘Multilevel European Patent Law as an Indirect Form of Regulation of New 
Health and Enhancement Technologies’, in M. L. Flear et al., supra note 11; Hervey and Black, ‘The 
European Union and the Governance of Stem Cell Research’, 12 Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law (2005) 3.
132 Rec. 2 Directive 98/ 44/ EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, OJ L 
213/ 13 (emphasis added).
133 Recs 5, 6, and 7, ibid.
134 Case C- 377/ 98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council (Biotechnology), [2001] ECR I- 7079 
(ECLI:EU:C:2001:523).
135 At para. 18.
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internal market and to protect against risks to the economy and legal integration 
rather than to health and safety or the environment: ‘uncoordinated develop-
ment of national laws on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions in the 
[EU] could lead to further disincentives to trade, to the detriment of the indus-
trial development of such inventions and of the smooth operation of the internal 
market’.136
Hence, the Directive also provides that it is not possible to patent certain prod-
ucts and processes.137 Under Article 6 that includes where commercial exploita-
tion would be contrary to ordre public or morality.138 Article 6(2)(c) provides an 
indicative list of processes to which the exclusion applies and that includes ‘the 
use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’. Consistent with 
its earlier decision, in Brüstle the CJEU observed that while the ‘the text of the 
Directive does not define human embryo’, the term ‘must be regarded, for the 
purposes of application of the Directive, as designating an autonomous concept of 
European Union law which must be interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the 
territory of the Union’.139 Having determined that there must be an EU- specific 
meaning of ‘human embryo’, the CJEU built on the indicative list in Article 6(2)
(c) by referring to the rationale for the Directive, including the specific reference 
in its recitals that ‘processes, the use of which offend against human dignity … 
are obviously also excluded from patentability’,140 to hold that the Directive’s 
‘context and aim … show that the EU legislature intended to exclude any possibil-
ity of patentability [of human embryos] where respect for human dignity could 
thereby be affected’.141 Consequently, the CJEU ruled that it ‘follows that the 
concept of “human embryo” within the meaning of Art. 6(2)(c) of the Directive 
must be understood in a wide sense’.142
Of course, the creation of a definition of ‘human embryo’ in EU internal mar-
ket law is an important consequence of the Directive.143 But the CJEU’s insistence 
that there had to be such a definition, and one that it has revisited and refined in 
International Stem Cell Corporation,144 is also important in that it indicates the 
136 Rec. 7 Directive 98/ 44/ EC, supra note 132.
137 Art. 4 mentions plant and animal varieties, essentially biological processes and Art. 5(1) men-
tions simple discovery of genes, both ibid.
138 Art. 6, ibid. The morality clause in Art. 53(a) European Patent Convention has been revised 
so that it corresponds to the Directive, see Rules 23b– 23e of the Implementing Regulations. For 
critical comment on this change, see D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics 
and Biolaw (2001), 197– 199.
139 Case C- 34/ 10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace, [2011] ECR I- 9821 (ECLI:EU:C:2011:669), at 
para. 26 (emphasis added).
140 Rec. 38 Directive 98/ 44/ EC, supra note 132.
141 Case C- 34/ 10, Oliver Brüstle, supra note 139, at para. 34 (emphasis added).
142 Ibid., at para. 34.
143 Ibid., at para. 27, citing Recs 3 and 5– 7 Directive 98/ 44/ EC, supra note 132.
144 Ibid., at para. 36, the CJEU held that the classification ‘human embryo’ applies to, e.g., ‘a 
non- fertilized human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been trans-
planted and a non- fertilized human ovum whose division and further development have been stim-
ulated by parthenogenesis’. The criterion for determining whether these fall within the term ‘human 
embryo’ is that they are ‘capable of commencing the process of development of a human being just 
as an embryo created by fertilization of an ovum can do so’. In Case C- 364/ 13, International Stem 
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way in which internal market law continues to connect with and regulate NHTs. 
Specifically, this exception to the Directive centralizes human dignity as a key 
concern and leverages it as a legitimating support for EU involvement in the field 
and, therefore, the market- oriented approach aimed at fostering the competitive-
ness of its domestic biotechnology industry. In terms of the latter, this decision 
seems to steer the EU’s domestic industry towards certain types of research such 
as that using adult stem cells,145 as well as certain kinds of behaviour like secrecy 
over manufacturing processes,146 and investment in companies based outside the 
EU, i.e. which are not subject to the Directive.147
The EU’s intellectual property law supports the narrowing of technologi-
cal risk to product safety by providing goods with a ‘bioethical stamp’ that 
ensures they are deemed respectful of human dignity and can, therefore, be 
legitimately marketed within the internal market. In addition, the EU also 
regulates research through intellectual property148 by providing rights to 
the results (now known as the ‘results’149). There are detailed provisions on 
Cell Corporation v. Comptroller General of Patents, judgment of 18 December 2014, not yet pub-
lished (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2451), the CJEU followed the opinion of its Advocate General in order 
to qualify this criterion further. The CJEU held that the criterion must be understood as meaning 
a non- fertilized human ovum must have the ‘inherent capacity to develop into a human being’ (at 
para. 28). As such ‘where a non- fertilized human ovum does not fulfil that condition, the mere fact 
that that organism commences a process of development is not sufficient for it to be regarded as a 
“human embryo” ’ (at para. 29). Thus, where ‘an unfertilised human ovum whose division and fur-
ther development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis did have the capacity to develop into a 
human being’ it is to be classified as a ‘human embryo’ and cannot be patented (as in Case C- 34/ 
10, Oliver Brüstle, supra note 139, at para. 31). But where ‘according to current scientific knowledge, 
a human parthenote, due to the effect of the technique used to obtain it, is not as such capable of 
commencing the process of development which leads to a human being’, it is not to be classified as 
a ‘human embryo’ and can be patented (as in Case C- 364/ 13, International Stem Cell Corporation, 
at para. 33 and para. 37).
145 Abbott, ‘Stem Cells: The Cell Division’, 480 Nature (2000) 7377.
146 Stem Cells Unpatentable if an Embryo is Destroyed, available at http:// www.patentbaristas.
com/ archives/ 2011/ 10/ 24/ eus- court- of- justice- stem- cells- unpatentable- if- an- embryo- is- destroyed/ 
(last visited 22 December 2016). Cf. Langer, ‘The European Court of Justice Bars Stem Cell Patents 
in Land Mark Decision’, The Bolt, Berkeley Technology Law Journal (2012), who argues that the rul-
ing may not have much effect at all (see http:// btlj.org/ 2012/ 01/ 05/ the- european- court- of- justice- 
bars- stem- cell- patents- in- landmark- decision/ (last visited 22 December 2016)).
147 E.g. the wide definition of ‘human embryo’ precludes the grant of patents on any products 
or therapies that rely on human embryonic stem cells derived from the destruction of a human 
embryo, however far removed from the original cell line. Such products might include those devel-
oped in order to treat incurable diseases of the eye and the cornea by the Institute of Ophthalmology 
at University College London. By contrast, the US- based company that brought Case C- 364/ 13, 
International Stem Cell Corporation, supra note 144, and which has developed similar products from 
a non- fertilized human ovum that, due to the effect of the technique used to obtain it, is not as such 
capable of commencing the process of development which leads to a human being, will be able to 
obtain a patent and generate a return on their investment (assuming the products are purchased in 
the internal market).
148 For a discussion of intellectual property as an indirect mode of regulation in this area see 
Hervey and Black, ‘The European Union and the Governance of Stem Cell Research’, 12 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law (2005) 3.
149 Under Horizon 2020 ‘results’ ‘means any tangible or intangible output of the action, such 
as data, knowledge or information, that is generated in the action, whatever its form or nature, 
whether or not it can be protected, as well as any rights attached to it, including intellectual property 
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ownership,150 dissemination and use,151 and access rights.152 One way in which 
these are important is in the situation which arises when the Commission 
objects to the transfer of ownership or grant of exclusive licence of ‘results’ 
to ‘third parties established in a third country not associated with Horizon 
2020’.153 Overall, therefore, internal market law is shaping and supporting 
technoscientific trajectories and the behaviour of those involved in research 
and development— and it continues to do so by engaging with and regulating 
research processes.
C.  Engaging with Research Processes
EU legislation also concerns research processes and like other stages in the prod-
uct development pipeline it is primarily concerned with product safety through 
risk assessment and risk monitoring, licensing, and inspection carried out by 
EU- mandated competent authorities of the Member State, and these focus on 
harmonizing Member State regimes and pre- empting divergences in approaches 
in relation to certain matters (i.e. it appears harmonization is not exhaustive). 
Two particularly important areas of engagement are the regulation of preclinical 
research through ‘good laboratory practice’154 (GLP) and clinical research through 
‘good clinical practice’ (GCP), and together these strengthen the role of internal 
market law in shaping and directing innovation in technoscience. Specifically, 
this legislation requires Member States to set standards for the planning, perfor-
mance, reporting, and archiving of research and to establish systems of monitor-
ing and inspection. In terms of GLP, EU law155 draws on the Organisation for 
Economic Co- operation and Development’s (OECD’s) work on good laboratory 
and clinical practice156 and on International Standards for audit, accreditation, 
and technical competence.157 In practice, much regulation is carried out through 
rights’. See Art. 2(1)(19) Regulation (EU) 1290/ 2013 Laying Down the Rules for Participation 
and Dissemination in ‘Horizon 2020— the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 
(2014– 2020)’ and Repealing Regulation (EC) 1906/ 2006, OJ 2013 L 347/ 81. Under FP7 ‘results’ 
were known as ‘foreground’, see Art. 39(1) Regulation (EC) 1906/ 2006 Laying down the Rules for 
the Participation of Undertakings, Research Centres and Universities in Actions under the Seventh 
Framework Programme and for the Dissemination of Research Results (2007– 2013), OJ 2006 
L 391/ 1.
150 Arts 41– 42, ibid. 151 Art. 43, ibid. 152 Arts 46– 49, ibid.
153 Art. 44(3), ibid.
154 Directive 2004/ 10/ EC on the Harmonization of Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions Relating to the Application of the Principles of Good Laboratory Practice and the 
Verification of their Applications for Tests on Chemical Substances, OJ 2004 L 50/ 44.
155 Art. 1(1), ibid., provides that Member States ‘shall take all measures necessary to ensure that 
laboratories carrying out tests on chemical products … comply with the principles of [GLP] … as 
laid down in Annex I to this Directive’. See also Rec. 8, ibid. Also see Directive 2004/ 9/ EC on the 
Inspection and Verification of Good Laboratory Practice, OJ 2004 L 50/ 28.
156 See Good Laboratory Practice, available at http:// www.oecd.org/ countries/ argentina/ good-
laboratorypracticeglp.htm (last visited 22 December 2016).
157 E.g. ISO/ IEC 17000:2004, Conformity Assessment— Vocabulary and General Principles, 
available at http:// www.iso.org/ iso/ catalogue_ detail?csnumber=29316); ISO 9000: 2005, Quality 
Management System— Fundamentals and Vocabulary, available at http:// www.iso.org/ iso/ iso_ 
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soft law guidance158 and includes preclinical safety evaluation of biotechnology- 
derived pharmaceuticals, or ICH S6 (produced in collaboration between the EU, 
US, and Japan),159 and further guidance applicable to clinical safety.160 Although 
compliance with these standards is not mandatory it is normally required for the 
studies that are used to support applications for clinical trial authorization or mar-
ket authorization. In either case (and in the former case because clinical trials are 
also required for the latter), the focus is on regulating harms or hazards pertaining 
to safety in order to get (safe) new products to market.
All laboratories carrying out tests on chemical products must comply with 
the OECD’s principles of GLP.161 The European Medicine Agency’s (EMA’s) 
instantiation of the latter principles162 focus on ensuring product safety by seek-
ing to ‘define a set of rules and criteria for a quality system concerned with the 
organisational process and the conditions under which non- clinical health and 
environmental safety studies are planned, performed, monitored, recorded, 
reported and archived’.163 Member States are permitted to ‘provisionally prohibit 
or make subject to special conditions the marketing of that substance on its terri-
tory’ where application of the GLP principles demonstrates a chemical substance 
examined under the Directive nevertheless ‘presents a danger to man and the 
environment’,164 which again underlines the importance of only certain harms or 
hazards as the subject of technological risk regulation. Exceptions from GLP are 
permitted for studies employing specialized test systems. These are often needed 
catalogue/ catalogue_ ics/ catalogue_ detail_ ics.htm?csnumber=42180); ISO 15189:  2007, Medical 
Laboratories— Particular Requirements for Quality and Competence, available at http:// www.iso.org/ 
iso/ iso_ catalogue/ catalogue_ ics/ catalogue_ detail_ ics.htm?csnumber=42641) (all last visited 22 
December 2016).
158 Produced by the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements 
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (the guidance in the immediately previous 
footnote is likewise produced by this international body). Guidance includes: Non- Clinical Safety 
Studies for the Conduct of Human Clinical Trials for Pharmaceuticals, (ICH M3[R2]) CPMP/ ICH/ 
286/ 95; Non- Clinical Safety Studies for the Conduct of Human Clinical Trials for Pharmaceuticals, 
(ICH M3[R2]) CPMP/ ICH/ 286/ 95; Safety Pharmacology Studies for Human Pharmaceuticals, (ICH 
S7A) CPMP/ ICH/ 539/ 00; Duration of Chronic Toxicity Testing in Animals (Rodent and Non- Rodent 
Toxicity Testing), (ICHS4A) CPMP/ ICH/ 300/ 95; Carcinogenicity:  Testing for Carcinogenicity of 
Pharmaceuticals, (ICH SIB) CPMP/ ICH/ 299/ 95.
159 See further Clinical Efficacy and Safety Guidelines, available at http:// www.ema.
europa.eu/ ema/ index.jsp?curl=pages/ regu lat ion/ genera l / genera l_  content_  000085.
jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0580027549 (last visited 22 December 2016).
160 Guidance on Quality, Pre- Clinical and Clinical Aspects of Gene Transfer Medicinal Products, 
CHMP/ GTWP/ 234523/ 09; Non- Clinical Studies Required before First Clinical Use of Gene Therapy 
Medicinal Products, EMEA/ CHMP/ GTWP/ 125459/ 2006; Biological Active Substances Produced 
by Stable Transgene Expression in Higher Plants, EMEA/ CHMP/ BWP/ 48316/ 2006; Guidance on 
Human Cell- Based Medicinal Products, EMEA/ CHMP/ 410869/ 2006; EMA, Reflection Paper on 
Stem Cell- Based Medicinal Products, CAT/ 571134/ 09; EMA, Reflection Paper on In- Vitro Cultured 
Chondrocyte Containing Products for Cartilage Repair of the Knee, CAT/ CPWP/ 568181/ 2009.
161 These are appended to Directive 2004/ 10/ EC, supra note 154, in Annex 1.
162 Defined in ibid., 2.1 of Annex 1.
163 Good Laboratory Practice, available at http:// www.ema.europa.eu/ ema/ index.jsp?curl=pages/ 
regulation/ general/ general_ content_ 000158.jsp (last visited 22 December 2016).
164 Art. 5(2) Directive 2004/ 10/ EC, supra note 154.
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for biopharmaceuticals and the exception from GLP facilitates speedier progress 
to marketing authorization. Even then the justification can be made that safety is 
not jeopardized and that, overall, preclinical trials place safety centre stage.
Prompted by disasters like the TGN1412 incident in which six first- in- human 
(Phase I) trial participants had to be placed in intensive care after suffering mul-
tiple organ failure,165 a precautionary approach to risk is likely to be adopted 
before moving to clinical research and seeking permission for trials from research 
ethics committees.166 As such, although the guidance works to steer preclinical 
research, it has ‘hard’ (and pre- emptive) effects in practice. Compliance with GLP 
(and the costs incurred) is justified by the need to ensure quality, efficacy, and 
safety of products— that is, technological risk is regulated (prior to and) in order 
to permit market circulation.
Clinical research, like GLP, is closely aligned to market authorization, dis-
cussed further later, in relation to which the relevant legislation mentions clinical 
trials data as the basis for the market authorization of pharmaceutical treatments 
on the grounds of their quality, safety, and efficacy.167 In other words, through 
these criteria technological risk pertains to a narrow range of harms or hazards 
and this provides the focus of the legislation rather than ‘comparative therapeutic 
efficacy’ of the medicine and a genuine need for it. Clinical trials are subject to 
specific regulation, with the Clinical Trials Directive168 (CTD) dating from 2001 
being replaced by the new Clinical Trials Regulation169 (CTR), which entered 
into force on 16 June 2014 but could not apply at the earliest before 28 May 2016, 
and is due to come into operation in 2018.170 The CTR (like the CTD before it) 
requires Member States to set standards for the planning, performance, reporting, 
and archiving of research. The very definition of clinical trials in the CTR (and 
the CTD) highlights their alignment to the requirements for market authoriza-
tion and the importance of its focus on the specific instantiation of technological 
risk (focusing on product safety) for the creation of biomedical knowledge and the 
technoscientific development it enables. Under the CTR, clinical trials are clari-
fied as being a type of clinical study171 that is an investigation:
165 Kmietowicz, ‘Rules for Drug Trials Should Be Tightened, Say Experts’, 333 British Medical 
Journal (2006) 276.
166 This is apparent from the long time it has taken Geron to progress to clinical development, 
even though it has substantial preclinical data for its human embryonic stem cell derived products; 
see http:// www.geron.com/ (last visited 22 December 2016).
167 Directive 2001/ 83/ EC, supra note 18.
168 Directive 2001/ 20/ EC on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions of the Member States Relating to the Implementation of Good Clinical Practice in 
the Conduct of Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, OJ 2001 L 121/ 34. This 
requires the Commission to establish principles relating to GCP and detailed rules in line with 
those principles.
169 Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014 on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, and 
Repealing Directive 2001/ 20/ EC, OJ 2014 L 158/ 1.
170 Art. 99, ibid. Directive 2001/ 20/ EC, supra note 168, continues to apply in a transitional 
period, see Art. 98, ibid.
171 Art. 2(2)(2), ibid. provides ‘clinical study’ ‘means any investigation in relation to humans 
intended: (a) to discover or verify the clinical, pharmacological or other pharmacodynamic effects 
of one or more medicinal products; (b) to identify any adverse reactions to one or more medicinal 
Mark L. Flear 105
  105
in relation to humans intended: (a) to discover or verify the clinical, pharmacological or 
other pharmacodynamic effects of one or more medicinal products; (b) to identify any 
adverse reactions to one or more medicinal products; or (c) to study the absorption, distri-
bution, metabolism and excretion of one or more medicinal products; with the objective of 
ascertaining the safety and/ or efficacy of those medicinal products.172
The reasons for the adoption of the CTR underline the salience and centrality of 
safety as the focus of technological risk regulation, as well as the marginalization 
of other kinds of harms or hazards within the development pipeline. Experience 
under the CTD gave rise to concerns that differences in its application in the 
EU’s (now) 28 Member States (up from 15 in 2001) would undermine scientific 
research.173 These differences were exacerbated by the ‘cumbersome procedures 
for multi- centre clinical trials in different Member States’ leading to an ‘impact 
on academic as well as non- academic research’.174 In particular, ‘Scientific devel-
opment … suggests that future clinical trials will target more specific patient 
populations, such as subgroups identified through genomic information. In order 
to include a sufficient number of patients for such clinical trials it may be nec-
essary to involve many, or all, Member States’.175 Attention here is on generat-
ing more specific safety data as the basis for the production and marketing of 
pharmaceuticals that are aimed at specific populations. Consequently, it became 
necessary to revise the applicable law, such as through the introduction by the 
EMA of an EU portal176 that serves as a single entry point for the submission 
of an application for the authorization of clinical trials to the reporting Member 
State177 and an EU database for the storage of the application and related data.178 
The EU portal also provides the means for communication of, inter alia, the result 
of the application.179
products; or (c)  to study the absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of one or more 
medicinal products; with the objective of ascertaining the safety and/ or efficacy of those medicinal 
products’.
172 Art. 2(2)(1) Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169 (emphasis added). This definition is 
very similar to that under Art. 2(a) Directive 2001/ 20/ EC, supra note 168, particularly the objec-
tive: a ‘clinical trial’ means ‘any investigation in human subjects intended to discover or verify the 
clinical, pharmacological and/ or other pharmacodynamic effects of one or more investigational 
medicinal product(s), and/ or to identify any adverse reactions to one or more investigational medic-
inal product(s) and/ or to study absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of one or more 
investigational medicinal product(s) with the object of ascertaining its (their) safety and/ or efficacy’ 
(emphasis added).
173 Since around the mid- 1980s the preference was to opt for the adoption of directives rather 
than regulations, and yet the increase in the number of Member States and diversity in their legal 
cultures (including in implementation and compliance with EU law) has led to a more general 
growing preference for regulations.
174 European Commission, Safe, Innovative and Accessible Medicines: A Renewed Vision for 
the Pharmaceutical Sector, COM(2008) 666 final, 8. Reflected in Rec. 4 Regulation (EU) 536/ 
2014, supra note 169.
175 Rec. 4 Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169. 176 Arts 5, 16, and 80, ibid.
177 In the first instance the trial sponsor shall propose the reporting Member State. In the event 
that this proposal is declined, more detailed rules determine which Member State shall report: see 
Art. 5, ibid.
178 Art. 81, ibid. 179 Art. 8, ibid.
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In order to introduce these changes and reinforce their utility so as to make 
it easier to generate safety data it was also necessary to reconsider the legal form 
or instrument in respect of clinical trials.180 As summarized in the CTR, the 
adoption of a regulation ‘would present advantages for sponsors and investiga-
tors, for example in the context of clinical trials taking place in more than one 
Member State, since they will be able to rely on its provisions directly [before national 
courts]’.181 By contrast, the CTD (as a directive) could only be relied upon directly 
in very specific circumstances;182 which meant that in most cases domestic imple-
menting legislation was applicable. In the case of the UK, for example, the CTD 
was adopted into domestic law by its transposition through the Medicines for 
Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004.183 In short, the adoption of an 
EU regulation (the CTR) more uniformly harmonizes and enhances the efficacy 
and uniformity of EU law. Further, under the CTR the link between clinical 
trials and product marketing, and the continuing focus on product safety as the 
specific instantiation of technological risk, is specified and tightened through its 
foundation on the dual legal basis of Article 114 TFEU and Article 168(4)(c) 
TFEU. These provisions provide objectives that are ‘pursued simultaneously’ and 
‘one is not secondary to another’.184 As regards Article 114 TFEU, the CTR:
harmonizes the rules for the conduct of clinical trials in the Union, therefore ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market in view of the conduct of a clinical trial in several Member 
States, the acceptability throughout the Union of data generated in a clinical trial and 
submitted in the application for the authorisation of another clinical trial or of the placing 
on the market of a medicinal product, and the free movement of medicinal products used in 
the context of a clinical trial.185
In a derogation from the limits on EU competence for the protection and 
improvement of health, Article 168(4)(c) TFEU builds on the shared competence 
in respect of common safety concerns relating to public health matters.186 With 
this provision as a legal basis, the CTR is used to set ‘high standards of quality and 
180 Consistent with the legal basis for internal market legislation under Art. 114 TFEU.
181 Rec. 5 Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169 (emphasis added). Art. 288 TFEU defines 
directives and regulations. A directive is ‘binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and meth-
ods’. By contrast a regulation has ‘general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States.’
182 Under the doctrine of direct effect. The CJEU has found that provided they are sufficiently 
clear, precise, and unconditional the provisions of directives can be relied upon before Member 
State courts as against the Member State only (that is, not individuals), but only where their dead-
line for implementation has passed and the Member State has not properly implemented them 
(Case 71/ 74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337 (ECLI:EU:C:1974:133); Case 148/ 78, 
Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629 (ECLI:EU:C:1979:110)). By contrast the CJEU 
has found that regulations are capable of being relied upon before Member State courts as against 
the Member State and individuals, as appropriate, from the date they enter into force and become 
applicable (as specified in the specific instrument) (Case 39/ 72, Commission v. Italy, [1973] ECR 101 
(ECLI:EU:C:1973:13)).
183 Statutory Instrument No. 1031/ 2004.
184 Rec. 82 Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169.
185 Rec. 82, ibid. (emphasis added). 186 Art. 4(2)(k) TFEU.
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safety for medicinal products by ensuring that data generated in clinical trials are 
reliable and robust’.187 Overall, founded upon this dual legal basis, the CTR is 
focused on regulating technological risk instantiated as product safety.
All clinical trials falling within the scope of the CTR (and CTD before it) must 
be designed, conducted, and reported in accordance with GCP, with Member 
States being required to establish systems of monitoring and inspection. Many 
of the GCP rules are further concretized in other legislation,188 which will be 
replaced in line with the application of the CTR.189 Detailed guidance established 
by the EMA, in accordance with the International Conference on Harmonisation 
of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use 
(ICH), supplements EU legislation on GCP.190 GCP is:
a set of detailed ethical and scientific quality requirements for designing, conducting, per-
forming, monitoring, auditing, recording, analysing and reporting clinical trials ensuring 
that the rights, safety and well- being of subjects are protected, and that the data generated in 
the clinical trial are reliable and robust.191
GCP frames the rights of individual trial subjects as concerning their protection 
from the risk of whatever is being trialled. In particular, at the heart of GCP is 
the requirement that ‘the rights, safety, dignity and well- being of subjects are 
protected and prevail over all other interests’.192 The relationship between risk and 
markets reappears here: the CTR (and the CTD) (and thus the detailed guidance 
based thereon) refers to the marketing of medicinal products as its underlying 
basis and highlights how risk articulates to markets, which is of course a conse-
quence of the legal basis for the regulation (Art. 114 TFEU).193
The CTR (like the CTD) makes reference to the ‘protection of trial subjects’.194 
Protection of the research subject is safeguarded through risk assessment based 
on the results of toxicological experiments prior to any clinical trial, screening 
by research ethics committees and Member States’ competent authorities, and 
rules on the protection of personal data.195 References to consent occur through 
the CTR,196 and it is connected with the protection of clinical research subjects 
‘such as the 2008 version of the World Medical Association’s Declaration of 
Helsinki’.197 Further protections are provided in the CTR, including for those 
who are incapable of giving legal consent to clinical trials.198 The EU database 
187 Rec. 82 Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169 (emphasis added).
188 Directive 2005/ 28/ EC Laying down Principles and Detailed Guidelines for Good Clinical 
Practice as regards Investigational Medicinal Products for Human Use, as well as the Requirements 
for Authorization of the Manufacturing or Importation of Such Products, OJ 2005 L 91/ 13.
189 For the state of play at time of publication, see Implementation Measures by the Commission 
in the Context of Regulation (EU) No 536/ 2014— Overview and State of Play, available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/ health/ files/ clinicaltrials/ overview_ clinical_ trials.pdf (last visited 22 December 2016).
190 EMA, E6: Guideline for Good Clinical Practice, CPMP/ ICH/ 135/ 95.
191 Art. 2(2)(30) Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169 (emphasis added).
192 Art. 3(a), ibid. 193 Rec. 8, ibid. 194 Ch. V, ibid. 195 Rec. 67, ibid.
196 Embedded throughout and including: Recs 15, 17, 27, 44, 76, and 80, Art. 3, and Ch. V (on 
protection of subjects and informed consent) ibid.
197 Rec. 80, ibid. 198 Especially Art. 31 and Art. 32, ibid.
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noted earlier brings together information on the content, commencement, and 
termination of clinical trials, which is subject to protections for confidentiality 
and invokes the right to privacy. Cross- references to the Data Protection Directive 
(that will have to be revised upon the adoption of the new EU data protection 
legislation)199 are also embedded throughout EU clinical trials regulation— but 
this protection of individual privacy essentially serves to legitimate the focus on 
regulating for product safety. The CTR maintains additional risk- related require-
ments in order to ensure product safety is central to the manufacture and import 
of investigational medicinal products,200 labelling,201 the verification of compli-
ance of investigational medicinal products with good clinical and manufacturing 
practice through inspections,202 and finally notification of adverse reactions.203 
Where the latter are fatal or life- threatening they must be notified to the compe-
tent authorities in the Member States. Overall, therefore, the CTR (like the CTD 
before it) and the detailed guidance upon which it is based are concerned with the 
regulation of technological risk in order to ensure the safety and marketability of 
products.
Special provision is made for research into paediatric and orphan products so as 
to facilitate their development, which is undermined by, inter alia, the generally 
more difficult research process, a potentially higher cost- to- benefit ratio than for 
other medicines, and the resulting reduced incentive to invest in them in the first 
place, all of which can relate to the often smaller numbers of people who can be 
research subjects and who might benefit from the availability of more specialist 
products in individual Member States. As in relation to intellectual property safe-
guards, therefore, specific regulation on paediatric and orphan products seeks to 
mitigate the risks (especially financial) to developers. Paediatric clinical research 
is supported by the EU’s legislation on medicinal products for paediatric use.204 
199 EU legislation currently comprises Directive 95/ 46/ EC on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, OJ 1995 
L 281/ 31 (Data Protection Directive). This includes data in healthcare settings, such as that in 
research and development of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies more broadly. Regulation 
(EU) 2016/ 679 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/ 46/ EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/ 1 entered into force on 24 May 2016, but will not apply until 
25 May 2018. Like the CTR and the proposed new medical devices legislation, the replacement of 
the Data Protection Directive with the General Data Protection Regulation is notable for adop-
tion of the latter legislation in the form of a regulation. The General Data Protection Regulation 
will (by its nature) better ensure the uniformity of EU law in relation to the protection of personal 
data (in addition there will be a new directive on the protection and free movement of data in rela-
tion to criminal offences and penalties— this is less important for present purposes). See further: 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final; European 
Commission, Agreement on Commission’s EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single 
Market, IP/ 15/ 6321. On the revision of EU data protection law, see Hustinx, supra note 9.
200 Ch. IX Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169. 201 Ch. X, ibid.
202 Ch. XIII, ibid. 203 Ch. VII, ibid.
204 Regulation (EC) 1901/ 2006 on Medicinal Products for Paediatric Use and Amending 
Regulation (EEC) 1768/ 92, Directive 2001/ 20/ EC, Directive 2001/ 83/ EC and Regulation (EC) 
726/ 2004, OJ 2006 L 378/ 1.
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This provides for, inter alia, EU- wide data collection of paediatric studies,205 an 
EU ‘network of excellence’,206 and a Paediatric Committee, operating within the 
general EU and ICH framework.207 The network ‘should contribute to the work 
of strengthening the foundations of the European Research Area in the context of 
Community Framework Programmes for Research, Technological Development 
and Demonstration Activities, benefit the paediatric population and provide a 
source of information and expertise for industry’.208 The network, as well as other 
incentives, such as the assessment by the EMA of paediatric investigation plans, 
fee waivers for scientific advice, information and transparency measures, and 
research funding under the FP and now Horizon 2020,209 are supported by EU 
funds.210 The focus of these efforts is on facilitating the market authorization of 
products for paediatric use. In other words, nevertheless the focus remains on 
regulating risk instantiated as being about product safety.
The same can be said about legislation on paediatric clinical research. The latter 
is carried out in relation to so- called ‘orphan’ medicines, that is, those intended 
for a rare disease or if the product’s development would not be commercially 
viable without incentives.211 As with other internal market legislation, a key jus-
tification for specific legislation for orphan products is the avoidance of distor-
tions of competition and barriers to cross- border trade within the EU.212 EU- level 
action was also justified ‘in order to take advantage of the widest possible market 
and to avoid the dispersion of limited resources’,213 as well as the need to foster the 
development of EU- based companies that can compete with companies based in 
the US and Japan; places that already had in place systems that incentivized the 
development of orphan drugs.214
In addition to GLP and GCP, and legislation on clinical trials and research 
into paediatric and orphan products, EU law also regulates the use of animals 
in the context of scientific research215 which includes research into NHTs.216 
This is subject to licensing, inspection, and oversight by a competent authority 
of the Member State,217 which is responsible for ensuring that all breeders, sup-
pliers, and users of animals in scientific research are authorized and registered 
and that they comply with the Directive.218 In order to facilitate compliance, 
205 Rec. 31 and Art. 41, ibid., provide that the database on clinical trials established by Directive 
2001/ 20/ EC ‘should include a European register of clinical trials of medicinal products for paedi-
atric use comprising all ongoing, prematurely terminated, and completed paediatric studies con-
ducted both in the Community and in third countries’.
206 Rec. 31 and Art. 44, ibid.
207 Directive 2001/ 20/ EC, supra note 168, and ICH guideline E11 on the Development of 
Medicinal Products for the Paediatric Population, are noted as important reference points for the 
Committee’s work. See Rec. 8 Regulation (EC) 1901/ 2006, supra note 204.
208 See Rec. 31 and Art. 44, ibid. 209 Rec. 30 and Art. 40, ibid.
210 Rec. 35, ibid.
211 Art. 3 Regulation (EC) 141/ 2000 on Orphan Medicinal Products, OJ 2000 L 18/ 1.
212 Rec. 3, ibid. 213 Rec. 3, ibid., also see Rec. 4. 214 Rec. 2 and Rec. 8, ibid.
215 Directive 2010/ 63/ EU on the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific Purposes, OJ 2010 
L 276/ 33. Art 62 provides that the Directive repeals Directive 86/ 609/ EEC from 2013 and Art. 63 
provides that the Directive replaces point (a)(iv) of Art. 8 Regulation (EC) 1069/ 2009.
216 Rec. 42, ibid. 217 Art. 59, ibid. 218 Art. 20(1), ibid.
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regular inspections are also required.219 Member States are required to recognize 
test data that complies with EU legislation on testing methods— without such a 
requirement Member States might create barriers to trade in the products that 
were tested.220 Moreover, although concern for animal welfare is reflected in the 
legislation, the rationale is similar to that for concern over human research sub-
jects: protection in order to satisfy ethics and rights- based concerns, but so as to 
support consumption of products that are deemed safe since they meet the criteria 
for market authorization.
EU law on genetically modified micro- organisms (GMMOs)221 and the harm-
ful release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)222 is 
the final example of the regulation of technological risk. Like the other examples 
considered here, product safety provides a key rationale for the applicable legisla-
tion. For instance, GMO legislation is founded on the idea that it is ‘necessary 
to approximate the laws of the [Member States] … concerning the deliber-
ate release into the environment of GMOs and to ensure the safe development 
of industrial products utilising GMOs’.223 Underpinning this legislation is the 
assumption that the harms or hazards that may arise from GMMOs or GMOs 
can be controlled. This is, of course, a matter of heated debate.224 In this way 
the legislation makes an implicit assumption about the nature and level of risk 
(in short, its focus) that are not necessarily shared by all— and far from being 
technical and neutral acts, they are actually intensely political. To give another 
example, Member States must ensure that a risk assessment is carried out by 
anyone using GMMOs.225 Competent authorities in the Member States are 
required to monitor, inter alia, the suitability of containment and other protec-
tive measures, waste management, and emergency response measures. In short, 
legislation on GMOs and GMMOs is intended to prevent the harmful release 
of such organisms.
Although particularly applicable to food, the legislation is also relevant to 
medicines that use GMMOs and GMOs which are developed and marketed 
within the EU. NHTs that are, or consist of, GMMOs or GMOs as defined 
in these directives have yet to be developed, but as mentioned earlier they are 
likely to become a reality. Such products would be covered by medicinal products 
219 Art. 34(1), ibid.
220 Rec. 42, Art. 2(2) and Art. 46, ibid. (with an exception for data that needs further testing for 
the protection of public health, safety, or the environment).
221 Directive 2009/ 41/ EC on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro- Organisms, 
OJ 2009 L 125/ 75.
222 Directive 2001/ 18/ EC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically 
Modified Organisms and Repealing Directive 90/ 220/ EEC, OJ 2001 L 106/ 1.
223 Rec. 7, ibid. 224 For discussion see Lee, supra note 8.
225 Defined in Art. 2(b), Directive 2009/ 41/ EC, supra note 221, as ‘a micro- organism in which 
the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/ or nat-
ural recombination; within the terms of this definition’. Further specification is provided in Annex 
I. They do not include, e.g., in vitro fertilization.
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legislation (which is considered next) rather than GMMO or GMO legislation, 
subject to the requirement for an equivalent environmental risk assessment.226 
Relatedly, one EU- funded project, TERPMED, hopes to ‘pharm’, that is, derive 
new bioactive molecules from genetically modified plants. ATryn, a product 
which was authorized for marketing in 2007, is expressed in the milk of transgenic 
goats. According to the EGE such animals are, therefore, potentially important 
‘[i] n fundamental bio- medical research to improve our genetic and physiological 
knowledge; [t]o make models of human diseases; [and] [a]s an alternative source 
of tissues and organs for “xenotransplantation” ’.227
D.  Marketing and Product Safety
As already pointed out, technological risk is a central concern of EU marketing leg-
islation and related guidance, and like the other techniques deployed through the 
development pipeline the focus is on regulating the harms or hazards that pertain to 
product safety of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Just as in relation to other 
types of regulatory activity, this focus marginalizes and obscures other kinds of harms 
or hazards to which risk might pertain as well as alternative understandings of risk 
and framings of regulation. In this way marketing legislation is the culmination of 
the EU’s various efforts to shape technoscientific trajectories, in that it ensures mar-
ket availability and a return on the investment of time and money in development. 
As such, this type of regulatory activity is vital to market optimization and through 
it the production and legitimation of the EU’s identity and project of integration. 
This legislation is concerned with ensuring pharmaceuticals and medical devices can 
be put onto the market, i.e. granted market authorization, but only when they are 
safe, efficacious, and of the correct quality, and it is to this extent that the legislation 
pre- empts Member State measures. EU legislation on medicinal products dates from 
the 1960s and is the oldest on product safety. The legislation has been significantly 
revised228 and is now assembled into the 2001 Community code.229
Under the Community code, medicinal products are defined by ‘presenta-
tion’230 and by ‘function’231 and that includes most pharmaceuticals except those 
that are ATMPs.232 There are several types of procedure for the marketing of 
pharmaceuticals,233 but it is the centralized procedure involving the EMA that 
226 Art. 5 Directive 2001/ 18/ EC, supra note 222. Also see EMA, Guideline on Environmental 
Risk Assessments for Medical Products Consisting of, or Containing, Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs), EMEA/ CHMP/ BWP/ 473191/ 2006— Corr.
227 Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology (now EGE), Ethical Aspects 
of Genetic Modification of Animals (Opinion No. 7).
228 E.g. Directive 65/ 65/ EEC on the Approximation of Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation 
or Administrative Action Relating to Proprietary Medicinal Products, OJ 1965 L 22/ 369.
229 Directive 2001/ 83/ EC, supra note 18. 230 For more detail see supra note 18.
231 Likewise, see supra note 18. 232 Regulation (EC) 1394/ 2007, supra note 21.
233 For an overview see Authorization Procedures for Medicinal Products, available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/ health/ authorisation- procedures_ en.htm (last visited 22 December 2016). Mutual 
recognition applies to most conventional products and means that a manufacturer can obtain mar-
ket authorization in one Member State after which it is recognized in all others— producing com-
petition between Member State regulators. There is also the less well- used decentralized procedure, 
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is most applicable to NHTs. This is the case since this procedure is compulsory 
for products derived from biotechnology (which obviously includes ATMPs) and 
includes vaccines produced by specially engineered plants noted earlier, orphan 
medicinal products, and products for human use containing an active substance 
authorized and intended for the treatment of HIV/ AIDS, cancer, neurodegenera-
tive disorders, or diabetes.234 Products that represent a significant scientific, thera-
peutic, or technical innovation or that benefit public health can also make use of 
this route to the market. Consistent with Article 114 TFEU the Community code 
and the legislation on the centralized procedure include safeguard clauses that 
permit temporary measures by Member States, but these focus on public health 
grounds.235 Public policy and public morality grounds are available to prohibit 
medicinal products including ATMPs, but they can be used only exceptionally.236 
The latter is therefore available to prohibit ATMPs that make use of, for example, 
embryonic stem cells. The narrow scope of these grounds for temporary national 
measures underscores the narrowing of regulatory attention to ensuring product 
safety, and the marginalization of other harms or hazards to which risk regulation 
might pertain.
EU legislation on medical devices currently takes the form of three directives, 
but these will (likely) be replaced by two new regulations.237 The reason for the 
replacement (like the replacement of the CTD by the CTR noted earlier) further 
which allows for simultaneous approval in several Member States and is applicable to the majority 
of conventional medicinal products.
234 Regulation (EC) 726/ 2004, supra note 20.
235 Specifically, Art. 35(1) Directive 2001/ 83/ EC, supra note 18, states: ‘Where a Member State 
considers that the variation of a marketing authorization which has been granted in accordance 
with the provisions of this Chapter or its suspension or withdrawal is necessary for the protection of 
public health, the Member State concerned shall forthwith refer the matter to the Agency’ (emphasis 
added). Art. 35(2) continues in a similar vein: ‘in exceptional cases, where urgent action is essential to 
protect public health, until a definitive decision is adopted a Member State may suspend the market-
ing and the use of the medicinal product concerned on its territory. It shall inform the Commission 
and the other Member States no later than the following working day of the reasons for its action’ 
(emphasis added). Art. 20(4) Regulation (EC) 726/ 2004, supra note 20, on the centralized proce-
dure states: ‘Where urgent action is essential to protect human health or the environment, a Member 
State may, on its own initiative or at the Commission’s request, suspend the use in its territory of a 
medicinal product for human use which has been authorised in accordance with this Regulation’ 
(emphasis added) and there are similar reporting procedures as under the Community code.
236 Rec. 13 Regulation (EC) 726/ 2004, supra note 20 states: ‘Member States should be able excep-
tionally to prohibit the use in their territory of medicinal products for human use which infringe objec-
tively defined concepts of public policy and public morality’ (emphasis added). More specifically, Rec. 
7 Regulation (EC) 1394/ 2007, supra note 21, states: ‘The regulation of advanced therapy medicinal 
products at Community level should not interfere with decisions made by Member States on whether to 
allow the use of any specific type of human cells, such as embryonic stem cells, or animal cells. It should 
also not affect the application of national legislation prohibiting or restricting the sale, supply or use of 
medicinal products containing, consisting of or derived from these cells’ (emphasis added).
237 At the time of writing, and by contrast to the regulation of clinical trials, the new medical 
devices legislation has yet to be adopted and so further consideration of the possible changes to EU 
regulation in this area will not be considered. See further Revision of the Medical Device Directives, 
available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ growth/ sectors/ medical- devices/ regulatory- framework/ revision/ 
index_ en.htm (last visited 22 December 2016).
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underscores the salience and centrality of product safety as the focus of techno-
logical risk regulation. Indeed, it is noted that against:
constant technological and scientific progress, substantial divergences in the interpreta-
tion and application of the rules have emerged, thus undermining the main objectives of the 
Directives, i.e. the safety of medical devices and their free movement within the internal mar-
ket. Moreover, regulatory gaps or uncertainties exist with regard to certain products (e.g. 
products manufactured utilising non- viable human tissues or cells; implantable or other 
invasive products for cosmetic purposes).238
The (proposed) new regulatory framework ‘aims to overcome these flaws and gaps 
and to further strengthen patient safety’.239 Significantly, safety is explicitly tied 
to the achievement of programmatic priorities, in that it is noted that the frame-
work ‘should be supportive of innovation and the competitiveness of the medical device 
industry and should allow rapid and cost- efficient market access for innovative 
medical devices, to the benefit of patients and healthcare professionals’.240
The current legislation on medical devices (at the time of writing) is (unusually) 
explicitly presented as ‘Based on the New Approach’241 to harmonization and is 
applicable to the cluster of examples referred to above, i.e. apps that monitor health 
and lifestyle, self- diagnosis kits like 23andme, and medical devices using DEHP. 
In addition to the Medical Devices Directive that in all likelihood applies to these 
examples, since it is applicable to devices that are used in the diagnosis, preven-
tion, monitoring, treatment, or alleviation of disease that do not achieve their 
intended purpose by pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic means (the 
definition of medical devices), there is also the Active Implantable Medical Devices 
Directive.242 There is a separate In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices Directive.243 
Medical devices legislation is important for marketing in that it requires and leads 
to ‘CE’ product safety certification, which is otherwise regulated in the EU by the 
Directive on General Product Safety.244 This system contrasts with that applicable 
to medicines, in that the CE system is more industry- based.245 These marketing 
238 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Medical Devices, and amending 
Directive 2001/ 83/ EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/ 2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/ 2009, 
COM(2012) 542 final, at 2 (emphasis added).
239 Ibid. (emphasis added). 240 Ibid. (emphasis added.)
241 Medical Devices, available at http:// ec.europa.eu/ health/ medical- devices/ regulatory- 
framework/ index_ en.htm (last visited 22 December 2016). Original capitalization.
242 See Directive 93/ 42/ EEC, supra note 19 on Medical Devices and Art. 1(2)(a) Directive 90/ 
385/ EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Active Implantable 
Medical Devices, OJ 1990 L 189/ 17. The latter Directive also covers devices used in ‘diagnosis, 
monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap, investigation, 
replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological process’ and to ‘control concep-
tion’. Under Art. 1(2)(c) an ‘active implantable medical device’ is defined as ‘any active medical 
device which is intended to be totally or partially introduced, surgically or medically, into the 
human body or by medical intervention into a natural orifice, and which is intended to remain after 
the procedure’.
243 Directive 98/ 79/ EC on In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices, OJ 1998 L 331/ 1.
244 Directive 2001/ 95/ EC on General Product Safety, OJ 2002 L 11/ 4.
245 Dorbeck- Jung and Chowdhury, ‘Is the European Medical Products Authorization Regulation 
Equipped to Cope with the Challenges of Nanomedicines?’, 33 Law and Policy (2011) 276, at 282.
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rules are also pertinent to the law and regulation of research processes discussed 
earlier in that marketing authorizations cannot be granted without compliance 
with principles of good laboratory and clinical practice.246
Similar to the pharmaceuticals legislation, medical devices legislation includes 
safeguard clauses that permit Member States to introduce temporary measures 
derogating from the free movement of goods, typically expressed in these or simi-
lar terms: ‘in order to ensure protection of health and safety and/ or to ensure that 
public health requirements are observed’.247 A little wider than the temporary dero-
gation on (essentially) public health grounds in relation to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts under the Community code, these temporary derogations again underline the 
narrow focus on product safety as the central concern of risk regulation through 
internal market law. The French ban on the use of tubes containing DEHP from 
paediatric, neonatal, and maternity units on public health grounds (again, which 
was noted in relation to negative integration) might therefore be permitted on 
a temporary basis.248 Further, this ban has in fact prompted attempts to ensure 
that future revisions of the applicable legislation contain a similar ban (which 
would of course be an EU- wide ban). This move underscores the interactive rela-
tionship between justifications for restrictions on free movement (here found in 
harmonization measures and to some extent duplicating those found in Article 
36 TFEU) and legislative revision in an effort to maintain a connection with and 
246 E.g. Rec. 4 Directive 2004/ 10/ EC, supra note 154 provides that the EU’s marketing leg-
islation lays down ‘that non- clinical tests on pharmaceutical products are to be carried out in 
accordance with the principles of … [GLP] in force in the Community for chemical substances, 
compliance with which is also required by other Community legislation’. Also see Rec. 3 Directive 
2005/ 28/ EC, supra note 188.
247 Art. 10(c) Directive 90/ 385/ EEC, supra note 242: ‘Where a Member State considers in rela-
tion to a given product or group of products that, in order to ensure protection of health and safety and/ 
or to ensure that public health requirements are observed, such products should be withdrawn from 
the market, or their placing on the market and putting into service should be prohibited, restricted 
or subjected to particular requirements, it may take any necessary and justified transitional meas-
ures’ (emphasis added) and ‘The Member State shall then inform the Commission and all the other 
Member States of the transitional measures, giving the reasons for its decision’. Elsewhere Art. 8 
Directive 93/ 42/ EEC, supra note 19 on Medical Devices states:
Where a Member State ascertains that the devices … when correctly installed, main-
tained and used for their intended purpose, may compromise the health and/ or safety 
of patients, users or, where applicable, other persons, it shall take all appropriate interim 
measures to withdraw such devices from the market or prohibit or restrict their being 
placed on the market or put into service. The Member State shall immediately inform the 
Commission of any such measures, indicating the reasons for its decision and, in partic-
ular, whether non- compliance with this Directive. (Emphasis added)
Finally, Art. 13 Directive 98/ 79/ EC, supra note 243, ‘Where a Member State considers … that, 
in order to ensure protection of health and safety and/ or to ensure that public health requirements are 
observed pursuant to Art. 36 of the Treaty, the availability of such products should be prohibited, 
restricted or made subject to particular requirements, it may take any necessary and justified tran-
sitional measures. It shall then inform the Commission and all the other Member States, giving the 
reasons for its decision’ (emphasis added). Once any of these safeguard clauses has been triggered 
the Commission goes on to consult the other Member States and decide on new or amended legis-
lation in order to address the regulatory challenge.
248 Most likely under Art. 8 Directive 93/ 42/ EEC, supra note 19.
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shape technoscientific trajectories (but in ways that continue to centralize product 
safety concerns over other possible matters as the focus of technological risk regu-
lation). However, further underlining the implications of the focus on product 
safety, a ban on 23andme for reasons beyond a failure to meet essential health and 
safety requirements would not seem to be permitted under this legislation— and 
since those requirements have been met the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency has authorized this product’s marketing in the UK.249
There is additional product safety legislation relating to human tissue,250 
blood,251 and organs.252 However, this legislation is not based on Article 114 
TFEU; instead it is based on (what is now) Article 168 TFEU (which as noted ear-
lier is the legal basis for EU action in the field of public health), since these things 
are not commonly recognized as ‘products’ in European cultures.253 The focus of 
this legislation is still on the regulation of risk, including in the case of NHTs. 
Yet, the fact that the basis of this legislation is Article 168 TFEU suggests that the 
market frame must sometimes recede from view or be supported by others— such 
as bioethics, as exemplified in references to EGE opinions in the recitals introduc-
ing and justifying legislation,254 or elsewhere through assurances of compliance 
with human rights protections, for instance in relation to clinical trials.
Overall, product safety legislation focuses on a narrow set of harms or hazards 
and it is these that form the focus of technological risk regulation understood as 
being about product safety and quality.255 The underpinning rationale of this 
focus is the internal market and the generation of economic optimization. As 
stated in the Community code: ‘Trade in medicinal products within the [EU] is 
hindered by disparities between certain national provisions, in particular between 
provisions relating to medicinal products … , and such disparities directly affect 
249 Again, in this case the legislation that is likely to apply is Directive 93/ 42/ EEC, supra note 
19. For authorization of ‘23andme’ see supra note 73.
250 Directive 2004/ 23/ EC on Setting Standards of Quality and Safety for the Donation, 
Procurement, Testing, Processing, Preservation, Storage and Distribution of Human Tissues and 
Cells, OJ 2004 L 102/ 48.
251 Directive 2002/ 98/ EC on Setting Standards of Quality and Safety for the Collection, 
Testing, Processing, Storage and Distribution of Human Blood and Blood Components and 
Amending Directive 2001/ 83/ EC, OJ 2002 L 33/ 30.
252 Directive 2010/ 53/ EU on Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for 
Transplantation, OJ 2010 L 207/ 14.
253 A.- M. Farrell, The Politics of Blood: Ethics Innovation and the Regulation of Risk (2012); Farrell, 
‘The Politics of Risk and EU Governance of Human Material’, 16(1) Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law (2009) 41.
254 E.g. Directive 2004/ 23/ EC, supra note 250 and Regulation (EC) 1394/ 2007, supra note 21.
255 See, e.g., Recs 1– 5, 8, 11, 13, 15, 19, 28, 31, and 32 and Arts 1, 8, 9, 11, and 16– 24, and of 
course the title of Directive 2004/ 23/ EC, supra note 250; Recs 3, 4, 7, and 11 Directive 2011/ 62/ 
EU amending Directive 2001/ 83/ EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products 
for Human Use, as regards the Prevention of the Entry into the Legal Supply Chain of Falsified 
Medicinal Products, OJ 2011 L 174/ 74. This Directive aims to prevent falsified medicines, which 
can include NHTs, such as the monoclonal antibody, Avastin, see the report to the effect that some 
samples of Avastin had salt, starch, and various chemicals, but none of the life- saving active ingredi-
ents, see http:// www.reuters.com/ article/ 2012/ 02/ 27/ us- avastin- idUSTRE81Q29X20120227 (last 
visited 22 December 2016).
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the functioning of the internal market’.256 So, for example, the need to ‘safeguard 
public health’ articulated as a patient or consumer safety matter is mentioned (and 
is the central ground for a temporary derogation from the legislation and the free 
movement of goods), but the rationale is protecting and promoting the market in 
those products.257 The Community code is exemplary of this: ‘[w] hile the fun-
damental objective of the regulation of medicinal products is to safeguard public 
health, this aim should nevertheless be achieved by means that do not impede the 
free movement of safe medicinal products within the Union’.258
An important consequence of the focus on safety and quality is that new prod-
ucts do not have to constitute improvements over and above what is already avail-
able. For example, as the EMA explains in its ‘soft law’ guidance on ‘medicinal 
products’, ‘it is not necessary for the benefit- risk profile of an experimental medicine 
[in clinical trials] to [be] at least as favourable as the benefit- risk profile of any or all 
established medicines in order to receive marketing authorisation’.259 For example, 
producing a new pharmaceutical that has fewer side effects can be useful, as can 
having multiple equally effective medicines available as a way of tackling resis-
tance to medication. However, consistent with the criteria for market authoriza-
tion under the Community code, clinical trials need only at the bare minimum 
ensure that pharmaceuticals are as good as or at least no worse than existing 
products. In short, the focus is on bringing goods to market rather than improve-
ments in health outcomes.
Regulating technological risk instantiated as product safety is of continuing 
importance in that it extends beyond market authorization into post- marketing 
monitoring and surveillance. In relation to medicinal products or pharmaceu-
ticals, for example, this occurs through so- called pharmacovigilance,260 a sys-
tem that requires those who hold the authorizations and medical professionals 
to be watchful for and report adverse reactions (a similar system operates under 
the medical devices legislation). The efficacy of ATMP products must also be 
256 Rec. 4 Directive 2001/ 83/ EC, supra note 18.
257 The EU is not alone in focusing on markets, see R. C. Eccleston, A Model Regulatory Program 
for Medical Devices: An International Guide (2001), at 3– 4.
258 Rec. 4 Directive 2010/ 84/ EU Amending, as Regards Pharmacovigilance, Directive 2001/ 
83/ EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, OJ 2010 L 348/ 
74 (emphasis added).
259 EMA, Reflection Paper on the Need for Active Control in Therapeutic Areas Where Use of Placebo 
is Deemed Ethical and One or More Established Medicines are Available, EMA/ 759784/ 2010, at 3– 4 
(emphasis added). Art. 82 Regulation (EU) 536/ 2014, supra note 169 states that on the basis of 
Art. 168(4)(c) TFEU the new regulation helps to ensure ‘that treatments and medicines which are 
intended to be an improvement of a treatment of patients build on reliable and robust data’ (empha-
sis added). This basis implies that clinical trials data is also intended to demonstrate that a new 
pharmaceutical is an improvement over what is already available. However, the criteria for market 
authorization ensure that this is not necessarily the case.
260 Regulation (EU) 1235/ 2010 Amending, as Regards Pharmacovigilance of Medicinal 
Products for Human Use, Regulation (EC) 726/ 2004, OJ 2010 L 348/ 1; Directive 2010/ 84/ 
EU Amending, as Regards Pharmacovigilance, Directive 2001/ 83/ EC on the Community Code 
Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, OJ 2010 L 348/ 74; Arts 101– 108b Directive 2001/ 
83/ EC, supra note 18.
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followed up261 and there is a requirement to ensure the traceability of ATMPs.262 
Member States share pharmacovigilance information through the EMA and its 
Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee, using the ‘Eudravigilance’ data-
base.263 In addition, the Product Liability Directive264 provides that producers 
are liable for damage caused by a defect in products, except where it is possible 
to show that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when 
the product was put into circulation was not such as to enable the defect to be 
discovered.265 In these main ways EU post- marketing legislation extends the pre- 
emptive effects of EU internal market law (in relation to Member State measures).
Although there is no harmonization of a ‘basket of healthcare goods’ across the 
EU’s internal market, there are additional post- marketing techniques aimed at 
facilitating take- up and consumption by healthcare systems. For example, there 
are efforts to develop common EU- level health technology methodologies for 
assessing NHTs.266 This occurs through the sharing of national health technol-
ogy assessments.267 These efforts are risk- based: they are concerned with assessing, 
inter alia, the product safety risks posed by NHTs and putting that knowledge 
forward for consideration in funding decisions.
5. Conclusions
It should be apparent by now that the EU’s internal market law remains of ongo-
ing relevance to the regulation of new and innovative technologies. Internal mar-
ket law plays a leading role by engaging with and seeking to regulate technological 
risk through the complementary modes of negative integration and positive inte-
gration that have been traced in Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter. In terms of nega-
tive integration, regulation principally occurs through the engagement of internal 
market provisions and principles with national measures that seek to regulate new 
technologies. In this mode EU law disapplies national laws that are deemed unjus-
tifiably restrictive to free movement. This does not go so far as to narrow the range 
of national regulation to product safety, but there is a narrowing of the scope of 
permissible risk regulation. The interpenetration of trade through the facilitation 
261 Art. 14(1) Regulation (EC) 1394/ 2007, supra note 21. For other medicinal products, gener-
ally only safety studies are requested.
262 Art. 15, ibid. 263 Regulation (EU) 1235/ 2010, supra note 260.
264 Directive 85/ 374/ EEC on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, OJ 1985 L 210/ 29.
265 Knowledge of the possibility of a defect is likely to make the defence inapplicable: A v. 
National Blood Authority, The Times, 4 April 2001 (QB).
266 This is a ‘toolkit’ that assists in making specific technology appraisal decisions (such as made 
by NICE in England).
267 Art. 15(2)(b) Directive 2011/ 24/ EU, supra note 17 provides that one of the objectives of the 
health technology assessment network shall be to support Member States in the provision of objec-
tive, reliable, timely, transparent, comparable, and transferable information on the relative efficacy 
as well as on the short- and long- term effectiveness, when applicable, of health technologies and to 
enable an effective exchange of this information between the national authorities or bodies.
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of free movement is in turn tied to the production and legitimation of the EU’s 
identity, socio- technical order, and the project of integration.
Through the complementary and necessary mode of positive integration the 
EU becomes even more clearly involved in the regulation of technological risk. 
This occurs through the use of various techniques, foremost among them internal 
market legislation, but also encompassing a range of supporting measures. These 
positive integration techniques are all directed at regulating technological risk 
instantiated narrowly as product safety, occasionally with references to guarantees 
of compliance with ethical standards and protections (and human rights usually 
through those). The central aim of these techniques is to prevent fragmentation of 
the internal market and the conditions of competition by steering, limiting, and, 
in the case of legislative measures, pre- empting diverse national approaches and 
responses to technological risk— and this actually underscores the complexity of 
risk and the scope for contestation.
In these ways the EU engages with technological risk, and that engagement 
becomes central to more than the continued application, efficacy, and legitima-
tion of its internal market law. Through its engagement the EU comes to present, 
produce, and legitimate itself— and its identity— in quite specific ways. The regu-
lation of risk provides the EU with a key opportunity to delineate the boundaries 
of its responsibility and accountability (i.e. for new technologies that are deter-
mined to be ‘safe’ within the narrow framing of risk), while sidelining notions of 
risk that pertain to alternative harms and hazards (besides product safety) and key 
normative questions about technoscientific trajectories, including what is being 
done, why, how, who benefits, and who is hurt. These matters are decided at 
the overarching level of governance, but through the subsequent framing of EU 
regulation as being about regulating a particular kind of risk they are effectively 
removed as topics of democratic debate. This is despite those dimensions being 
key biopolitical issues for the EU’s citizenry, as well as those who are enfolded in 
the regime or consume its products,268 but who are thereby reduced to and gov-
erned as a very particular kind of European ‘risk society’.269
This analysis points to the role of technological risk regulation in extending 
existing power relations, technoscientific, and ultimately sociopolitical trajecto-
ries. Far from simply following technoscientific development and struggling to 
keep up, internal market law is of central importance to attempts at steering its 
path and direction, engaging as it does through tightening relations with research 
and knowledge creation, manufacturing processes, and marketing.270 In these 
ways the analysis in this chapter also alludes to the ways in which internal market 
268 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population:  Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977– 1978 
(2007).
269 U. Beck, Risk Society:  Towards a New Modernity (1986); U. Beck, World at Risk (2009); 
Giddens, ‘Risk Society: The Context of British Politics’, in J. Franklin (ed.), The Politics of Risk 
Society (1998).
270 Resonant with work in Science and Technology Studies:  Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co- 
Production’, in S. Jasanoff (ed.), States of Knowledge (2004); S. Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (2005).
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law is itself representative of (re)configurations between power and responsibility 
(through the extension of EU power through its market orientation and beyond 
the formal Treaty- based boundaries), governance and the governed (with the lat-
ter extending beyond EU citizens to encompass consumers of internal market 
law- compliant products and those enrolled as biomedical labour in regulatory 
processes), knowledge and power (seen in tightening and co- productive relations), 
and sovereignty and territoriality (through the EU’s regulation of free movement 
across the territory of its Member States), in order to ensure market circulation of 
products and generate economic optimization.271
Overall, the chapter underlines a concern that has been largely overlooked in 
legal scholarship on new technologies: the alignment, (re)configuration, and (re)
orientation of law to and within market- oriented norms, values, and rationalities, 
as part of political projects of rule (here, the EU’s) that seek to shape techno-
scientific innovation and trajectories in order to serve their particular priorities 
and aims. In other words, through engagement with technological risk, internal 
market law is itself being (re)articulated, (re)imagined, (re)oriented, and harnessed 
as part of a broader strategy of building and (re)legitimating the EU’s identity 
as a supranational entity.272 In this strategy the EU’s socio- technical order and 
ultimately the project of European integration are to be established upon and 
legitimated through the achievement of a competitive, innovative, and optimized 
economy. The focus of the strategy, in short, is on increasing the market availabil-
ity of goods rather than ensuring that they are comparatively better than existing 
options, meet genuine health needs, and improve health outcomes.
Despite the masking of these normative dimensions, and the marginalization 
of other kinds of harms or hazards to which risk might pertain, the EU’s domi-
nant market- based identity, order, and model of integration can be challenged. 
The downplaying of other possible responses to technological risk occurs through 
constraints on the type, scope, and nature of risks that can feasibly be regulated 
at Member State level by negative integration and the further limiting of national 
diversity in technoscientific development by various complementary positive inte-
gration techniques that in the case of legislation have pre- emptive effects. The 
downplaying of other responses marks an attempt to influence technoscientific 
trajectories by limiting contestation. However, crucially, that same attempt also 
points to the existence of, and potential for the recognition of, wider understand-
ings of risk and alternative framings of regulation.
In particular, although currently inflected in places and seeming to operate 
more as legitimating devices, it is possible to use human rights and bioethics 
in order to contest and (re)frame regulation, especially harmonization legislation 
and supporting measures. For example, there could be an increased stress on the 
271 Foucault, supra note 4; A. Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception:  Mutations in Citizenship and 
Sovereignty (2006). Cf. W. Walters and J. H. Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality 
and European Integration (2006).
272 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983); Y. Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus (1990); J. C. 
Scott, Seeing Like a State (1998).
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EU’s responsibility to ensure a high level of human health protection in order to 
ensure the development of products that are safe, genuinely needed in order to 
meet pressing health needs, and comparatively better than existing options. These 
(and other possible) framings can bring into view and regulate for a more diverse 
set of aims and concerns, recognize contestation about the focus and direction 
of scientific and technological development, and facilitate democratic debate.273 
Far from lagging behind technoscientific development, the way in which the EU 
keeps up— via internal market law and supplementary techniques that are steered 
by the aims and priorities set at the overarching level of governance— leads to a 
particular economic and market identity and orientation and the downplaying of 
other possible responses.
273 For discussion see Flear, Governing Public Health, supra note 10.
